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Abstract
This article examines the initially cooperative but increasingly tense relationship between the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and Africa. It assesses the various legal and political reasons for
the mounting criticisms of the ICC by African governments, especially within the African Union
(AU), following the indictment of incumbent Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al Bashir. The
author situates the ICC within broader African efforts to establish more peaceful societies through
the continent-wide AU. He submits that the ICC, by prosecuting architects of serious international
crimes in Africa's numerous conflicts, could contribute significantly to the continent's fledgling
peace and security architecture which aims to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and to anticipate and avert crimes against humanity. On the other hand, the author suggests that the ICC also
has much to gain from Africa, especially in these early years when it is seeking to become a functional court of law with global legitimacy. By undertaking independent, fair and credible prosecutions without alienating States Parties, the world criminal court is more likely to fulfill its mandate
and to win over powerful hold outs, such as the United States, China, and India. This will help it
co-opt the support necessary for its universal reach and future success. However, he cautions that
given Africa's sensitive historical experience with foreign interventions, including the slave trade
and colonialism, the international criminal justice regime anchored on the ICC may be undermined, or perhaps even falter, if it is perceived as having a biased, politicized or insensitive application to a single region of the world.

Keywords
Africa; International Criminal Court; African concerns about ICC

* B.A. (Guelph), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill), M.St. and Chevening Scholar (Oxon); of the Bar of
Ontario, Canada; formerly Associate Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and the Legal Advisor/Duty Counsel to the Office of the Principal Defender, Special Court for
Sierra Leone. I wish to thank various people for their excellent comments on an earlier draft, especially William A. Schabas, Joseph Rikhof, Janewa Osei-Tutu and Alhagi-Marong. Errors and omissions are mine. E-mail: jallohc@gmail.com.
© Koninldijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009

DOI 10. 1163/157181209X457956

C. C Jalloh/ InternationalCriminalLaw Review 9 (2009) 445-499
We are not against internationaljustice. It f'ust] seems that Africa has become a laboratory to test
the new internationallaw.
His Excellency Jean Ping, Chairperson, African Union Commission.'
Rwanda cannot be party to ICCforone simple reason.., with ICC allthe injusticesof thepast including colonialism, imperialism, keep coming back in diferentforms. They controlyou. As long asyou
are poor, weak there isalways some rope to hangyou. ICC is madefor Africans andpoor countries.
His Excellency Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda.'

1. Introduction
On 2 February 1999, Senegal became the first country in the world to ratify the
Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court (the Rome Statute).' Senegal's
speedy ratification symbolically capped Africa's early support for the idea of a
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) with jurisdiction
over the "most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole."'4 The historic ratification by the small West African state, from amongst a
group of 120 countries that signed the Rome Statute at its adoption on 17 July
1998, demonstrates a keen awareness of the significance that the accomplishments
of the ICC would imply for the world as a whole and for Africa in particular.
Indeed, as the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
observed during the final five-weeks of the Rome negotiations, the continent of
Africa had a special interest in the establishment of the ICC because its people
had for centuries endured human rights atrocities such as slavery, colonial wars
and other horrific acts of war and violence which continue today despite the continent's post-colonial phase. 5 Furthermore, fresh memories of the tragic and "preventable" 6 Rwandan genocide in 1994, in which the international community
was forewarned about genocide but chose not to act, strengthened Africa's resolve
to support the idea of an independent and effective international penal court that
would punish, and hopefully deter, perpetrators of such heinous crimes in the
" BBC News, 'Vow to pursue Sudan over "crimes"', 27 September 2008, online at: <http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7639046.stm> (visited 15 May 2009).
2) D. Kezio-Musoke, 'Kagame tells why he is against ICC charging Bashir', Daily Nation, 3 August
2008, online at: < hrtp://allafrica.com/stories/200808120157.html> (visited 15 May 2009).
3)UN doc. A/CONE 183.9.
4) Preamble, ICCSt, para. four.
) Professor T Maluwa, Legal Adviser, OAU Secretariat, Statement at 6 ,hPlenary, 17 June 1998.
See Official Records of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishmentofan InternationalCriminalCourt, UN doc. A/CONE 183/13 (Vol. 11) 104, 115-118
at para. 116.
')Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide- The Report of the InternationalPanel ofEminent Personalities
to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the SurroundingEvents (Addis Ababa: OAU, 7 July
2000).
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future. 7 Not surprisingly, the continent went on to play a significant and constructive role in the Rome negotiations which ultimately led to creation of the Court.'
Today, over a decade after the Rome Statute was adopted, African countries,
many of which are either embroiled in devastating conflicts or newly emergent
from them, have continued to invest their yearnings for peace and stability in the
hope that the freshly minted ICC will become a success story, and one that will
benefit them. As of writing, there are 108 States Parties to the Rome Statute.9 Of
all the regions, Africa has generated the largest support base for the Court at 30
ratifying states. This constitutes over half of the continent's 52 countries. 't Thirteen
additional African countries have signaled their support for the treaty through
their signatures. Africa is followed by 25 states from Western Europe, 23 from
Latin America and the Caribbean, 16 from Eastern Europe and 14 from Asia.
However, the significance of the continent's strong endorsement of the ICC is not
adequately reflected by the numbers alone. It is perhaps better captured by the reality that African states are likely to be the frequent users, or "repeat customers", for
the Court because of a relatively higher prevalence of conflicts and serious human
rights violations and a general lack of credible legal systems to address them.
There are currently four situations under formal ICC investigation." Of those,
three reflect the continent's wide embrace of the Court. Uganda,' 2 the Democratic

7)Maluwa, supra note 5, at para. 116.

s)H. allow andE Bensouda, 'International criminal law in an African Context', in M. du Plessis
(ed.), African Guide to InternationalCriminalJustice (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008)
pp. 15-54, at 41. See also P Mochochoko, 'Africa and the International Criminal Court', in
E Ankumah and E.Kwakwa (eds.), African Perspectives on International CriminalJustice (Accra:
Africa Legal Aid, 2005) and S.Maqungo, 'The Establishment of the International Criminal Court:
SADC's Participation in the Negotiations' 9 African Security Review (2000).
9)One hundred and thirty countries have signed the Rome Statute. See ICC, 'Status of Ratifications
of the Rome Statute', online at: <http:llwww.icc-cpi.int/MenusASP/states+parties> (visited 15
May 2009).
10) The countries are as follows: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, online at:
<http:llwww.icc-cpi.intlstatesparties.html> (visited 15 May 2009). Significantly, this list includes
the regional powers Nigeria and South Africa.
") In addition, the Prosecutor is currently conducting a preliminary analysis of various other
situations. Three of those, namely Chad, Kenya and Ivory Coast, are in Africa while the others
are from around the world including Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia and Palestine. ICC Office of
the Prosecutor, 'Frequently Asked Questions: Where is the Office of the Prosecutor currently
active?' online at: <http:llwww2.icc-cpi.intlMenus/ICC/Structure+of+the+CourtOffice+of+the+
ProsecutorlFAQl> and 'Visit of the Palestinian National Authority Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Riad al-Maliki, and Minister of Justice, Mr. Ali Khashan, to the Prosecutor of the ICC, 13
February 2009, online at: <http:/lwww2.icc-cpi.intlNR/rdonlyres/4CCO8515-DOBA-454D-A594446F30289EF2/280140/ICCOTP20090213Palestinerev.pdf> (visited 15 May 2009).
2) Referral submitted in December 2003. Decision to open investigation followed on 29 July
2004.
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Republic of Congo (DRC)' 3 and the Central African Republic (CAR), 4 all of
which are parties, were the first countries to break the ice of impunity by successively giving work to the ICC through so-called "self-referrals" of their respective
situations for investigations and possible prosecution. 5 Of course, the Court's
jurisdiction is based on complementarity. This means that it is only where a state
is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution"
that it can assert jurisdiction. 16 While it could be argued that the African Article
14 referrals were made despite the fact that the states in question may have been
willing and able to prosecute, by inviting the permanent court to investigate
international crimes within their territories, those three nations put aside the
sovereign pride that traditionally impeded state action towards punishment of
gross humanitarian law violations. From an international treaty law perspective,
they demonstrated good faith towards their Rome Statute obligations consistent with the edict pact sunt servanda in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT).' 7 They affirmed willingness, but acknowledged some inability,
to address the international crimes being committed against their people
within their territories. In so doing, Uganda, the CAR and the DRC waived
complementarity and put themselves on the line to offer the first test cases to an
untested court. 8
Though obviously also motivated by other selfish reasons, for example, a desire
to punish elusive adversaries or concerns about the political costs of unpopular
domestic prosecutions, these self-referrals are still significant given that the Rome
Statute applies equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity.' 9 Indeed, the ICC regime does not recognize any exception from prosecution or confer any immunity on public officials - whether heads of state,
elected representatives or other government officials. Nor does it allow any military commanders, or persons acting as such, to evade prosecution for international
offences committed by subordinates or others within their effective control.2 °
Therefore, by referring their situations to Court Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo
for investigations, the leaders of those countries, for instance President Yoweri

'1 Referral submitted in March 2004. Decision to open investigation followed on 5 July 2004.
W4' Referral submitted on 7 January 2005. Decision to open investigation followed on 27 May
2007.
'5) Referrals take place under Art. 14 ICCSt (Referral of a situation by a State Party). For commentary, see C Kress, '"Self Referrals" and "Waivers of Complementarity"', 2 JournalofInternational
CriminalJustice (2004) 944-6 and P Gaeta, 'Is the Practice of'Self-Referrals" a Sound Start for the
ICC?', 2 Journalof InternationalCriminalJustice (2004) 951-52.
6) Art. 17()(a) ICCSt (Issues of admissibility).
'7' (1979) 1155 UNTSt 331. Art. 26 states: Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.
0) On the idea of waiver of complementarity, see generally Kress, supra note 15.
* Art. 27 ICCSt. (Irrelevance of official capacity).
20) Art. 28 ICCSt. (Responsibility of commanders and other superiors).
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Museveni of Uganda whose army reportedly has a patchy record of compliance
with the laws of war, rendered themselves and their military commanders more
directly vulnerable to indictment and prosecution.
This is more than a mere theoretical possibility. In fact, the Prosecutor has
already been criticized for singling out crimes allegedly committed by rebel or
opposition leaders, while ignoring offences apparently perpetrated by government forces in places like Uganda and the DRC.2" For his part, Moreno-Ocampo
has pledged to conduct impartial investigations and to prioritize cases of higher
gravity.22 That said, his approach of initially targeting non-state actors is likely
also driven by pragmatic considerations given the need for continued cooperation
of the relevant national authorities to enable his work. Nevertheless, he may later
charge others to show even-handedness and perhaps boost the legitimacy of his
decisions.
Sudan is the fourth and currently last situation to be triggered. The United
Nations Security Council (the Security Council) referred that nation to the ICC
in Resolution 1593 (2005) pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.23 That
provision empowers it, consistent with its Chapter VII power in the Charterof the
United Nations, to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, to
refer non-parties for investigation and possible prosecution.2 4 The Sudan referral
was recommended by a UN commission of inquiry which essentially found that
international crimes were being committed in Darfur and should therefore be
prosecuted.25
Due to the Bush Administration's "aversion"2 6 towards the Court, the United
States of America (the U.S.) initially opposed the idea of referring Sudan to the
Hague-based permanent court. However, it ultimately faced significant pressure not to veto the referral resolution after it failed to garner sufficient support
within the Security Council for its proposed alternative - an establishment of
21) WA. Schabas, 'Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism', 6 Journalof InternationalCriminal
Justice (2008) 731-761, at 752-753.
22) ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Fourth Session of the
Assembly of State Parties', 28 November - 3 December 2005 at 3, online at: <http://www.icc-cpi
.int/NR/rdonlyres/169D 124D-A2C3-444B-B498-A3FFD8CF 177C/277382/LMO_20051128
_English 1.pdf> (visited 15 May 2009) (noting that, given the gravity of the crimes committed by
the LRA, it was clear that 'we must start with the LRA').
23) SC Res. 1593, 31 March 2005.

Sudan signed the Rome Statute on 8 September 2000 but has not yet ratified it. While unlikely
to do so now, it is still bound to avoid conduct that would defeat the object and purpose of the
treaty.
25) Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (Geneva: UN, January
25, 2005), at paras. 569-589, 647-649.
26) 'U.S. Fiddles Over ICC While Darfur Burns: U.N. Security Council Should Reject U.S. Scheme
for Ad Hoc Court', Human Rights Watch, online at: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/O1/31/
usintl009 l_txt.htm> (visited 15 May 2009).
24)
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an ad hoc tribunal for Sudan.27 The U.S. abstained from the vote on the controversial resolution and has since become increasingly favorable to the
28
prosecution.
Africa's strong backing for the Court has not been limited to the continent's
governments. Confronted with a slew of unaccountable regimes and outright
dictatorships that pay little or no heed to basic human rights principles, African
civil society - individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) endorsed early on the idea of a standing international penal court. Indeed, many
from the continent played an important role advancing the objectives of the
unprecedented global network that gave extra momentum to the conclusion of
the Rome Statute. This was done primarily through advocacy at home, but also
through the influential and unprecedented NGO Coalition for the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court. As part of this, activists from the continent
and their counterparts in other parts of the world mobilized shame to stir the
conscience of their governments towards agreement on contentious issues. The
end product, while perhaps falling short of the stated preferences of individual
advocacy groups over the years of negotiations, was a more robust instrument
than even the ICC's strongest supporters could sensibly have hoped for.29
Once the treaty was adopted, African and other human rights NGOs quickly
transformed themselves into an effective global campaign for swift achievement
of the 60 ratifications required for the Rome Statute to enter into force. This, of
course, breathed life into the ICC in July 2002 - much sooner and more dramatically than anyone could have reasonably anticipated.30 Afterwards, many of those
same organizations supported the work of the Preparatory Commission to assist
in developing important ancillary legal instruments, for example, the Court's
rules of procedure and evidence and the elements of crimes.3"

See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Letter to U.S. Secretary of State Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice
dated 21 January 2005, 'ICC Best Chance for Justice in Darfur: U.S. Should Support or Abstain
from Security Council Referral of Darfur to the International Criminal Court', online at: <http://
hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/21/sudan1O090.htm> (visited 15 May 2009).
2') See, e.g., L. Condorelli and A. Ciampi, 'Comments on the Security Council Referral of the
Situation in Darfur to the ICC', 3 JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice (2005) 590-97.
29) WR. Pace and M. Thieroff, 'Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations', in R.S. Lee
(ed.), The InternationalCriminal Court: The Marking of the Rome Statute - Issues, Negotiations,
Results (The Hague: Kiuwer Law International, 1999) pp. 391-398, at 395. Over 20 African NGOS
were invited to participate in the Rome Statute negotiations pursuant to GA Res. 52/60, 15
December 1997. Participation included attending plenary and formal meetings of subsidiary bodies at the conference except the drafting group, receiving official documents, providing material to
delegates and by addressing certain open and closed sessions of meetings. See Note by the [UN]
Secretary-General,Non-Governmental OrganizationsAccredited to Participatein the Conference, UN
doc. A/CONE183/INF/3, 5 June 1998.
3)
WA. Schabas, An Introduction to the InternationalCriminalCourt (2nd edn., Cambridge: CUP,
2004), p. 19.
30 Pace and Thieroff,supra note 29, at 397.
27)
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Today, African civil society seems to have entered a third phase of advocacy
whereby it now leverages prior contacts within governments to not only lobby for
the remaining ratifications, but also adoption of the necessary legislation and
domestic programs to give effect to their Rome Statute obligations. Overall, given
the serious governance deficit on the continent, local and international human
rights NGOs played an important role sensitizing political leaders to the potential benefits of a strong court for Africa. They therefore seem set to continue
influencing the evolution of international criminal justice issues on the continent
in the future.
It is against this backdrop that this article examines the recent controversy
about the ICC's current work in Africa, a quintessential example of the proverbial
moving target, in light of its global mandate to prosecute those most responsible
for serious international crimes and concerns expressed by various African leaders. In this regard, I argue that current trends indicate that some African states are
tempted, based more on hasty political assessments than on sober legal analysis of
the Rome Statute, to throw out the ICC baby with the bath water. I submit that
they should not. Overall, while conceding that some AU criticisms of the Court's
current prosecutorial practice may be justified, I maintain that it would not be in
Africa's best interest to ostracize the permanent ICC as an institution at this early
stage of its lifespan. This is particularly so given that the bulk of the apparent
African disquiet seems to stem largely from the actions of only one of its four
organs. In this vein, I situate the Court within Africa's broader efforts to build
more peaceful and stable societies. I then highlight some of the gains that can
accrue from the ICC for the African Union's (AU) fledgling peace and security
"architecture" which aims to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts through an
early warning system that even authorizes military intervention to anticipate or
avert the commission of grave international crimes.
On the other hand, I suggest that the Court, especially its prosecutor, must
take AU criticisms of its work more seriously than appears to be the case now. In
this regard, unlike conventional wisdom which portrays it as the generous giver
and Africa as its hapless beneficiary, I argue that the ICC also stands to reciprocally benefit from the continent, especially in these early years when it is seeking
to become a functional court of law with global legitimacy.32 In my view, the
Court today needs Africa as much as Africa needs the Court. However, I submit
that it should not be construed as the International Criminal Court for Africa, or
the African (International) Criminal Court. In fact, I maintain that the emerging international criminal justice system, which is anchored on the world's only

other words, I go beyond the suggestion that the relationship is a one-way street and that it
is only Africa that needs the ICC. See, e.g., D. Iber, 'Africa Needs Judicial Body', Pan African News
32) In

Agency, 4 October 1999 (arguing that Africa, with its numerous internal armed conflicts, is in

'desperate need' for an international criminal court).
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permanent penal court, offers a "win-win" prospect for both sides. Nevertheless,
I caution that given the continent's sensitive historical experiences with foreign
interventions, especially the trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonialism, the international criminal justice regime that the ICC represents may be undermined, or
perhaps even falter, if it is perceived as having a biased, politicized or insensitive
application to this sole and relatively more vulnerable region of the world.
For the sake of clarity, my argument is not rooted in politics. Nor is it a moral
case for the powerful ICC to give extra attention to a powerless and complaining
Africa. Rather, it is a legal argument based on the Court's mandate articulated in
the Rome Statute, especially the principle of complementarity, which recognizes
and underscores that measures taken at the national level are the key to the prevention and punishment of international crimes. In some respects, it is a reminder
for African governments that in the long run they are better off in a world with,
rather than without, an independent and effective ICC.
By the same token, it is a call for pragmatism on the part of the Court since, as
a multilateral treaty-based body, no matter how powerful and unprecedented it
may be, it does not have a standing police force or army to enforce its orders.
Thus, it is completely dependent upon the cooperation of its States Parties and
the goodwill of many others to carry out its work - whether to investigate situations, collect evidence, detain suspects, execute arrest warrants, facilitate witness
testimony, enforce subpoenas for documents, judicial orders, sentences, and so
on. In fact, while states have generally cooperated with them, the experience of
the United Nations (UN) ad hoc criminal tribunals amply demonstrate that if
national authorities refuse to assist such courts, international criminal justice will
become paralyzed and unable to fulfill its necessary and expanding role in international society.3 3 This Achilles heel is exposed by the elaborate provisions in the
constitutive instruments of the various international penal courts, including the
Rome Statute, purporting to compel state cooperation. International prosecutors, whose most routine work is only possible because of state support, know this
reality all too well and have therefore repeatedly emphasized that support from

This dependence on state cooperation is starkly illustrated by an important case in the UN
criminal tribunal for Rwanda. Following an Appeals Chamber decision to release Jean BoscoBarayagwiza for abuse of process on the part of the Prosecutor, Rwanda suspended its cooperation
and took certain steps to show its displeasure, including denials of visas and access to the country.
About 16 witnesses were denied permission to travel to the seat of the tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania
to testify, threatening to ground judicial proceedings to a halt. An application for reconsideration
was duly lodged by the Prosecutor based on alleged new facts about the circumstances in which the
problematic detention of the accused had taken place. The judges revisited the issue and ordered
Barayagwiza's trial. Rwanda resumed its cooperation. The accused was later convicted. See Prosecutor
v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza (ICTR-97-19-AR72), 'Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or
Reconsideration', Appeals Chamber, 31 March 2000, para. 34 and Declaration of Judge Rafael
Nieto-Navia, paras. 1-8.
131
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national jurisdictions is one of the pillars on which the future of international
criminal justice depends.Y
This article is divided into six parts and a conclusion. Besides the Introduction
(Section 1), Section 2 starts by situating Africa within its broader historical context. It sketches how the prevalence of internecine conflicts and gross human
rights violations have led to an African pre-occupation with the question of how
to build more peaceful societies after conflict and mass atrocity. Section 3 then
turns to the continent's more recent efforts to stem serious international crimes. It
is argued that the establishment of the AU and its ongoing efforts to build a peace
and security architecture with primary responsibility to prevent, manage and
resolve African crises and conflicts are integral parts of this trend. Section 4 briefly
considers the main international and hybrid tribunals which preceded and, in
many ways paved the way for the creation of the permanent ICC, to demonstrate
the strong African role in their founding and in the emergence of an international
criminal justice system. Section 5 will then briefly highlight some of the key concerns that have been expressed regarding the ICC's recent work in Africa. Focusing
on the fallout from the Sudan situation and the Bashir arrest warrant, I endeavor
to show why some African leaders now perceive the Court as nothing more than
the new imperialism masquerading as international rule of law.35
To challenge this notion, I maintain in Section 6 that impunity for egregious
international crimes seems to no longer be available in Africa given the various
mechanisms that the AU has sought to develop to counter it, including the first
regional implementation of the so-called right of humanitarian intervention. In
this context, and considering their respective positions currently, I propose that
both the continent and the ICC share a mutual interest in addressing heinous
international crimes. It is therefore logical for the two sides to closely collaborate.
In this vein, I suggest that there is mutual gain to be reaped, and conversely a
"mutual vulnerability" to be confronted, should they fail to do so. 36 Section 7 then

34) See, e.g., Special Court for Sierra Leone, Press Release, 'War Crimes Prosecutors Meet in

Freetown', 27 June 2005 (noting that '... the tribunals are greatly reliant on the cooperation of
national states', concluding that '...the tribunals cannot succeed without the firm commitment of
sovereign states to discharge their legal and treaty obligations ... State cooperation with the international criminal tribunals is one of the pillars upon which the future development of international
law depends.')
31)

C. Jalloh, 'The Law and Politics of the Charles Taylor Case', Canadian Council on International

Law Web Bulletin, April 2006, online at: <http://www.ccil-ccdi.ca/index.php?option=com-content
&task=view&id= 165&Itemid=76> (visited 15 May 2009) (observing, in passing, that Africa was
the only scene of investigations and the first arrest warrant by the ICC; warning that a failure to
address perceptions that international criminal law is being built on the back of Africans may have
profound implications which could undermine the legitimacy of the emerging international criminal justice system).
I') This phrase appears to have been first coined within the context of development theory by
J. Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability. 7he GlobalPoliticalEconomy ofDevelopment and
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examines some key legal and political challenges that appear to undermine progress towards complete trust between the two sides. It is submitted that as these
issues are resolved over time, there will likely be more predictability and therefore
less tension in relations between Africa and the Court. Finally, in the conclusion,
I summarize my central arguments and provide a tentative assessment of the
broader implications of the current impasse for the ICC and the continent.

2. Background - The State of Modern Africa
Following centuries of foreign domination, first during the trans-Atlantic slave
trade and then under colonialism, the late 1950s and early 1960s ushered in an
era of political independence for most African countries. However, the hopes of
millions of people on the continent that political independence would translate
into greater prosperity, stability and development were dashed as the decades
wore on. Worse, many states started exhibiting features that have led one Nigerian
37
scholar to describe Africa as "a continent in perpetual turmoil."
As is widely acknowledged, no single internal factor has contributed more to
the continent's malaise than the scourge of conflict. "8 Indeed, according to the
UN, since 1970, well over 30 wars have been fought in Africa. Of these, the vast
majority were within, as opposed to between, states. 39 The continent has thus
become the most conflict affected and conflict prone region in the world. In this
regard, between 1980 and 1994, 10 of the 24 most war tormented countries were
in Africa. 40 Well over a decade later, by 2007, the region still played generous host
to the majority of the world's conflicts. 4' The scale and nature of these generally

Underdevelopment (2nd edn., Ottawa: IDRC, 1999), 13. The idea was subsequently articulated by
1. Head, On a Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1991).
37) 0. Oko, 'The Challenges of International Criminal Prosecutions in Africa', 31 Fordham InternationalLaw Journal(2008) 343-414, at 343.
38)See, e.g., the Preamble to the Constitutive Act, para. 9; Peace and Security Protocol, para. 10;
the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental
Changes Taking Place in the World, Summit of the Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, July 1990.
"I Report ofthe Secretary-Generalto the UnitedNations Security Council: The causes ofconflict and the
promotion ofdurablepeace and sustainabledevelopment in Africa, UN doc. A/52/87 I-S/1998/318,
16 April 1998, at para. 4.
4o) Cabinet Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention in Africa, 'Causes of Conflicts in Africa',
Consultation Document - March 2001, online at: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflictafrica.pdf> (visited 15 May 2009).
41 L. Harbom and P Wallensteen, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 'Frequently Asked Questions:
How many conflicts were there in the world in 2007?', online at: <htrp://www.pcr.uu.se/research/
UCDP/linksfaq/faq.htm#4> (visited 15 May 2009).
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vicious conflicts have directly or indirectly affected the lives of millions of people,
many of whom have been displaced from their homes and forced to abandon the
basis of their already impoverished livelihoods.
With the conflicts have come extreme violence and the deliberate targeting of
civilians, rather than armies, and in some cases, entire ethnic groups. Countries like
Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sudan and Uganda became household names that evoked memories of barbarous
acts, intractable violence, and ultimately, partial or complete collapse of state institutions, and sometimes, even the state itself. Ruthless military dictatorships, famine, abject poverty, barbaric civil wars in which civilians were not justfair game but
the only game, widespread human rights abuses, including the commission of serious international crimes, have all regrettably become enduring features on the continent. Africans, ever so generous, supplied ample examples of the conditions that
political scientists, such as Robert Kaplan, used to apocalyptically warn about the
"coming anarchy" on the continent and elsewhere.42
In seeking to address the momentous challenges facing the continent, it became
evident from Africa's experience between the immediate post independence
period in the 1960s, and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, that the
continent and its people cannot rely on the UN or the "international community" to solve its numerous crises. Overall, a slow response, or more often no
response, characterized international policy towards the continent.43 In fact, some
African countries, instead of cashing in the expected post-independence peace
and economic dividends, became scenes of proxy wars where superpower rivalries
44
played out; often, with devastating consequences for local populations.
Furthermore, for Africa, the East-West stalemate that stymied the Security
Council during the Cold War essentially transformed it into the Insecurity
Council, especially on burning issues of human security.
Yet, even after the world bid farewell to communism, the UN seemed unable
to discharge its function of ensuring the collective peace. 4' It consequently was

R Kaplan, The ComingAnarchy: Shatteringthe Dreams ofthe Post-Cold War (New York: Random
House, 2000).
41) See A.M Kambudzi, 'The International Criminal Court and Africa: The AU and the ICC', in
M. du Plessis and A. Louw (eds.), The Investigation andProsecutionof'Core InternationalCrimes'and
the Role ofthe InternationalCriminal Courtin Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007)
27-39, at 29.
41) Ihese rivalries played out in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa where the two
power blocs
had strategic interests. Proxy wars were fought in the region. For example, South Africa attacked
Angola in 1975 while Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977.
45) A. Cassese, 'International Criminal Justice: Is it Really so Needed in the Present World
Community?', Public Lecture (London School of Economics) 13 November 2001, online at:
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/PubiicLectures/PL-InternationalCriminal
Justice.pdf> (visited 15 May 2009) (arguing that a 'striking feature' of international relations today
is that the UN Security Council has proved unable to 'solve major international crises').
42)
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unable to meaningfully assist African nations to stem the tide of violence and
gross human rights abuses spawned by the continent's incessant conflicts. Worse,
Africa's own home grown OAU, founded with high expectations that it will
swiftly deliver continental unity, got caught up in a faulty logic that exalted
extremist versions of sovereignty and the principle of non intervention in the
internal affairs of its member states. While it scored occasional successes in some
areas, notably through support for national liberation struggles especially the
fight against apartheid, it failed to make a lasting impact in alleviating the myriad
complex emergencies facing the continent.
In the economic arena, Africa became the only continent with zero growth in
three decades. As the OAU nailed its own coffin, it bequeathed conditions that
would much later prompt British Prime Minister Tony Blairto characterize Africa,
in a campaign for increased G-8 aid to the continent, "as a scar on the conscience
of the world. '4 6 Blair urged the industrialized countries to play doctor and "heal"
the wounds of Africa.47 Some called his statement a spin doctoring exercise.
Others, more cynical, just saw another outgoing Western leader shopping for a
legacy cause.

3. The Emerging African Peace and Security Architecture
After the OAU's demise, Africa's multifaceted human security challenges naturally featured high on the agenda of the continent's leadership. Within the framework of the new AU, the stated objective has been to promote peace, security and
stability on the continent based on the understanding that this is the only way
Africa can protect the well being of her peoples and their environment as well as
create conditions conducive to sustainable economic growth and development.48
It has therefore started building a so-called continental peace and security "architecture" by creating interlocking institutional mechanisms aimed at preventing,
managing and resolving crises and conflicts. 49
Two overarching ideas underpin the fledgling regime. First, the early detection,
intervention and management of crises would help prevent their escalation into
full blown conflict. Second, in the long term, the best guarantor of peace is the
creation of a transparent democratic, political and economic environment meeting the needs of all individuals and groups within society. The AU has gone so far
as to pledge to undertake the immense, costly and unprecedented task of post

"I C. McGreal,'Blair Confronts Scar on World's Conscience', The Guardian,7 February 2002.
47) The Independent, 14 August 2004.
4')Preamble, Constitutive Act, para. 8.
4, Kambudzi, supra note 43, at 30.
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conflict reconstruction, peace building and revitalization of state institutions in
its member states experiencing conflict.5°
This ambitious plan was outlined mainly in the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Peace and
Security Protocol) adopted in Durban, South Africa on 9 July 2002. That instrument established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as the permanent mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution on the continent under
Article 2. Though primarily responsible for the region's efforts in the area of
human security, the PSC was conceived as part of a larger and integrated peace
maintenance and peace enforcement machinery. It will therefore not operate in
clinical isolation from other AU organs and initiatives.
In fact, Article 2(2) of the Peace and Security Protocol envisages that the PSC
shall collaborate with and complement other components of the architecture, in
particular, the Chairperson of the AU Commission; a five member Panel of the
Wise; the Continental Early Warning System; the African Standby Force and a
Special Fund. Moreover, the AU's broader peace and security framework puts
into play the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution and a host of additional human rights related treaties and instruments."' Taken together, these suggest a shift from the continent's paradigmatic
focus on conflict resolution to a comprehensive approach to human security
which factors political, economic, social and other considerations into the formula for peace and stability.52
Significantly, in a provision that seems to signal a radical break from the informal
"scratch my back and I scratch yours" OAU policy that condoned gross human
rights violations committed by African governments, the ConstitutiveAct of the
African Union (Constitutive Act) gave the AU the right in Article 4(h): "to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".53
This clause was reiterated in Article 7(0)(e) of the Peace and Security Protocol
which empowered the Council to:
recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, intervention,
on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war
crimes, genocide and crimes againsthumanity, as defined in relevant international conventions
and instruments;"

50) Arts. 3(a)(Objectives) and 14 (Peace building), Peace and Security Protocol.
SI

These include, for instance, the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, adopted by

the 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Abuja, Nigeria (January 2005).
52) AU Commission Conflict Management Division, Meeting the Challenge ofConflict Prevention in

Africa: Towards the Operationalizationof the ContinentalEarly Warning System (Addis Ababa: AU,
2008), Foreword.
"1 Emphasis added.
") Emphasis added.
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T-he common logic of these provisions is the AU's recognition, stated in Article
4(0) of the Constitutive Act, that there ought to be: 'respect for the sanctity of
human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination,
acts of terrorism and subversive activities'.
Importantly, the "sanctity of human life" and "rejection of impunity" can be
given concrete effect to protect vulnerable populations through the AU's unilateral deployment of the African Standby Force in "grave circumstances" or,
alternately, at the "request of an AU Member State" to restore stability as per
Article 13(C) of the Peace and Security Protocol. Through the entrenchment of
these provisions into the AU's primordial instruments, the continent has become
the first region in the world to provide a specific legal basis for military intervention during conflict in order to protect vulnerable civilians. In this way, despite
obvious resource shortages that would pose serious challenges for implementation, it has paved the way for the first regional implementation of the much
5
vaunted doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect"."
Beyond these provisions, which constitute the main pillars of the AU's budding peace and security architecture, it was obvious that the impoverished Africa
could not go it alone if it is to successfully address the continent's complex and
multi faceted post-Cold War emergencies. African governments therefore undertook in the Constitutive Act as well as in the Peace and Security Protocol to
engage other governments and civil society, international organizations, for
example, the UN, as well as other external entities that could assist it to realize its
human security objectives. 56 In relation to the Court, these instruments open up
an avenue for mutually beneficial AU-ICC cooperation on issues ranging from
technical cooperation to concrete measures combating impunity. Indeed, until
recently, there were high level discussions about a Memorandum of Understanding
between the two institutions. 57 The recent controversies regarding the Sudan situation have slowed down the AU appetite for all things ICC. So it has inevitably
tempered enthusiasm for those discussions.

"' The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) aims to balance concerns about state sovereignty and the imperative to act, if need be with force, to halt genocide and crimes against humanity. See The Responsibility to Protect:Report ofthe InternationalCommission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001) online at: <http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>
(visited 15 May 2009). R2P was endorsed by SC Res. 1674, 28 April 2006 on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict and GA Res. 60/1, 24 October 2005 setting out the World Summit
outcome. For more on the R2P and the AU, see K Powell, 'The African Union's Emerging Peace
and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to
Protect', May 2005 Working Paper (The North-South Institute), online at: <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/
english/pdf/responsibility-protectafrica.pdf> (visited 15 May 2009).
s Art. 13(C), Constitutive Act; Arts. 17(4) and 20, Peace and Security Protocol.
Kambudzi, supra note 43, at 35-37.
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4. The ICC as the Anchor of the Emerging International Criminal Justice
System
Africa's security environment is probably the worst when compared to other
regions. But it is by no means unique. In fact, with the end of the Cold War, the
international community witnessed, and continues to witness, the rise or revival
of destructive variants of nationalism, religious fundamentalism and ethnic
hatred, all of which stoked old animosities or spawned new ones and, ultimately,
58
gave way to new forms of violence specifically, terrorism and ethnic cleansing.
Confronted with these problems, states and the international community are
increasingly compelled to act to address mass atrocities. The question no longer
seems to be whether, but rather how, to respond to gross human rights violations.
In this regard, according to Cassese, we can observe in deployment various "fallback solutions" developed by the international community to tackle such problems.59 These solutions can be discerned at the national and the international
levels, and sometimes, at the intersection of the two.
First, national courts, for example those in the U.S., are increasingly willing to
invoke jurisdictional grounds like territoriality or nationality. Second, domestic
courts are routinely assuming the duty to confront atrocities perpetrated abroad
through civil proceedings and awards of financial compensation to victims of
human rights atrocities. Third, states are nowadays concluding treaties, such as
the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture, which provide for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction by their local courts with the attendant obligation to prosecute or extradite suspected perpetrators. Fourth, states are increasingly resorting
to truth commissions to address odious crimes of the past, especially in Latin
America and Africa. Fifth, a range of international courts and human rights treaty
monitoring bodies, whether the European Court of Human Rights or the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights, have jurisprudentially extended their
jurisdiction to cover crimes perpetrated abroad by officials of state parties to their
founding treaties. In respect of the continent, there have been attempts to bolster
the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. These
include the adoption of a new protocol with the view to the creation of a more
robust and binding African human rights court mechanism. This is in addition to
an increasing number of sub-regional courts of justice with competence to hear
human rights cases in east, west and southern Africa.
Finally, and more relevant to our purposes here, the UN and the international community have, in the wake of shocking atrocities in specific conflicts
around the world, sought to prosecute the planners and architects of those crimes,
58) A.

Cassese, InternationalCriminalLaw (I" edn., Oxford: OUP, 2003), 3.

51) Ibid. at 5-14.
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principally genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Accordingly, in
1993 and again in 1994, the Security Council invoked, for the first time, its
Chapter VII powers to establish two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively (ICTY and ICTR).
At first blush, the international criminal tribunals appear to be part of an
impressive ready-made international post conflict toolkit. However, it has been
suggested that they are in fact merely substitutes for the failures to take concrete
action to prevent or stop those tragedies. 60 Some have even argued that those
courts were designed to assuage the guilty conscience of the international community in the face of its impotence when confronted with ethnic cleansing in the
Balkans and genocide in Rwanda. 61 Whatever the case, at the request of the relevant governments, the UN has subsequently supported the creation of international or internationalized courts notably, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 62 Similarly, it
also facilitated the establishment of war crimes panels in the national courts of
63
East Timor and Bosnia.
All these courts have, to varying degrees and each in their own way, contributed to settling the norm of individual accountability for serious international
crimes at the international level. 64 Nevertheless, their statutory mandates limited
prosecution to specific crimes, committed within specific time frames, within
specific territories. These limitations in their founding instruments notwithstanding, the ad hoc tribunals have been generally criticized, among other things, as
slow and expensive relative to their number of trials, incurring costs amounting
in the billions of dollars. 65 This has since led the Security Council to require them
6(1)

See comments of the Rwandese Representative to the Security Council, UN doc S/PV.3453,

1994 at 14 and S.R. RatnerandJ.S.Abrams, AccountabilityforHuman RightsAtrocities in International
Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (2 "d edn., Oxford: OUP, 2001), at 191 and 201.
61) H.J. Steiner and P Alston, InternationalHuman Rights Law in Context. Law, Politics, Morals
(2nd edn., Oxford: OUP, 2000), at 1155.
62) The UN has more recently also supported the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
However, that is an internationalized court solely addressing common crimes under Lebanese law.
For a thorough overview and key challenges, see the November 2007 symposium issue on the
Lebanon Tribunal by the JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice.
63) For an overview of the origins, establishment and issues confronting those courts, see
WA. Schabas, The UN InternationalCriminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra
Leone (Cambridge: CUP, 2006); CPR. Romano et al., (eds.), Internationalized Criminal Courts:
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
") For discussions of their contributions, see, e.g., E. Mose, 'Main Achievements of the ICTR',
3JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice(2005) 920; C C.Jalloh, 'The Contribution of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone to the Development of International Law', 15 AfricanJournaloflnternational
and Comparative Law (2007) 165-207; L.J. van den Herik, 7he Contribution of the Rwandan
Tribunaltothe Development oflnternationalLaw(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) and G. Mettraux,
InternationalCrimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: OUP, 2005).
65) See, e.g., R. Zacklin, 'The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals', 2 JournalofInternational
CriminalJustice (2004) 541-545, at 545 (concluding that the ad hoc tribunals have been 'too costly,
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to adopt completion strategies, which include provisions for the transfer of certain cases to willing national courts for prosecution. 66 It was envisaged that this
would enable them to wrap up their work within a few years. A major concern
that has since been expressed from both sides of the adversarial divide within the
tribunals is that the completion strategies risk turning into completion tragedies with a seeming rush to closure that could undermine the fairness and legitimacy of the remaining trials, and possibly even tarnish the legacy of those
67
institutions.
Against this backdrop, it should be obvious that the advent of the ICC is
an important institutional development in the evolution of international criminal law. With a mandate over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
the additional and all important crime of aggression (once that crime is eventually defined), the Court is expected to leverage economies of scale, the principle
of complementarity and its permanency to ensure greater accountability for
certain crimes in a manner hitherto thought impossible. As the world's only permanent international penal tribunal, the existence of the ICC theoretically renders future ad hoc courts unnecessary. Indeed, many had hoped that creation
of a standing court would, among other things, help ensure greater consistency
in the application of international criminal justice by removing or at least distancing it from the vagaries of Security Council politics. That did not happen as a
role was ultimately carved out in the Rome Statute for that body to refer and
defer situations. With hindsight, this involvement of a political body in a judicial
process has now come to haunt the Court, as the Sudan controversy starkly
demonstrates.
In any case, recent experience with the inauguration of an internationalized
Special Tribunal for Lebanon suggests that there may be compelling reasons for
the UN and the international community to do otherwise in specific situations.
Be that as it may, by the time the existing ad hoc courts shut down in a few years,
the ICC may be the last court standing. It will therefore remain as the permanent
anchor of the emerging international criminal justice system.

too inefficient and too ineffective'; and that they reflect an approach that is 'no longer politically or
financially viable.')
') For an overview of the transfer process in relation to the Rwanda Tribunal, see A. Marong,
CC. Jallob, and D. Kinnecome, 'Concurrent Jurisdiction and the ICTR: Should the Tribunal
Transfer Cases to Rwanda', in E. Decaux, A. Dieng and M. Sow (eds.), From Human Rights to

International Criminal Law: Studies in Honour of an African Jurist, the Late Judge La'y Kama
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) pp. 159-201.
See the issue containing the workshops 'A Critical Look at Ad Hoc Tribunals' Completion
Strategy: Open Questions and Prospects for the Future', 6 JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice
(2008) 681-709. See comments by P Murphy and M.B. Harmon offering defence and prosecution
perspectives respectively. Cf. response by Judge Erik Mose, the former President and Vice-President
of the Rwanda Tribunal.
67)
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5. "[M] isuse of Indictments against African leaders": Changing Tone or
Political Rhetoric?
Adopted amidst much fanfare on 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute entered into
force on 1 July 2002. The ICC was universally acclaimed as an historic milestone,
including by African governments and civil society. Indeed, as KofiAnnan, then
UN Secretary-General put it, the Court's establishment was "a gift of hope to
future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal
human rights and the rule of law."68 Annan, a Ghanaian diplomat not known for
hyperbole, subsequently proclaimed the ICC the "missing link in the international justice system. "' 69

Just over a decade later, the Court has come under serious criticism from various quarters in Africa. Professor MamoodMamdani, a respected Ugandan scholar,
has eloquently captured this sentiment by arguing that notwithstanding its name,
the "ICC is rapidly turning into a Western court to try African crimes against
humanity. 70 To him, "the realization that the ICC has tended to focus only on
African crimes, and mainly on crimes committed by adversaries of the United
States, has introduced a note of sobriety into the African discussion" and fuelled
concerns about a "politicized justice" and even bigger questions about the "relationship between law and politics". 7' Today, Africa's dream for a strong, independent and effective court that would assist it to secure enduring peace through the
application of international justice to various conflict or post-conflict situations
appears, at best, to be facing major challenges. At worst, the dream seems to be
turning into a nightmare as AU leaders agonize over the "misuse of indictments
'72
against African leaders.
As the above quotations from AU Commission Chair Jean Ping and
Rwandan President Paul Kagame demonstrate, some in Africa - especially
national authorities whose roles are critical for the Court's success - are now
beginning to question what they perceive as the blunt and one-sided application of the international criminal law instrument to indict only weak individuals from generally poor African states. 73 Some of the opposition appears to
stem from a conflation of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction with ICC

Statement of the UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan at the ceremony held at Campidoglio celebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 18 May 1998.
' Press Statement by UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan, 11 April 2002.
70) M. Mamdani, 'Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order: How the ICC's "responsibility
to protect" is being turned into an assertion of neo-colonial domination', Pambazuka News 396
(English edn.), online at: <http://www.pambazuka.org> (visited 15 May 2009).
71) Mamdani, supra note 70.
72")
AU Peace and Security Council Decision (PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII)), 21 July 2008, para. 3.
7) As reported in the Daily Nation, supra note 2.
68)
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jurisdiction.7 4 Unfortunately, existing sensitivities have now been heightened to
the point that President Kagame has gone so far as to suggest that the Court is a
"fraudulent institution" reminiscent of "colonialism" and "imperialism" that is
seeking to undermine and to control Africa.7 5 His position is echoed by others,
such as President Thomas Yayi of Benin, who lamented the "harassment" of
African leaders and concluded that "[w]e have the feeling that this court is chasing Africa."7 6 On these views, the current trajectory of ICC indictment practice,
limited as it is to investigations of African situations and African nationals, is
mere manifestation of the efforts to transform itself beyond paper tigerdom into
a legitimate and functional court of law. In other words, while exaggerated and
largely unsupported by the facts, the growing perception is that Africans have
77
become the sacrificial lambs in the ICC's struggle for global legitimation.
There have been various criticisms of the Court in each of the four situations
under its current scrutiny. However, Sudan has arguably been the most challenging for the ICC. Since the Security Council referral, the Prosecutor has successfully issued three arrest warrants arising from the Darfur investigations though
78
there seems to be little or no prospect for their execution, at least, at this stage.
The most recent of these was that of incumbent Sudanese President Omar Hassan
Al Bashir. 79 The latter has proven to be highly controversial within legal and political circles, in Africa and elsewhere.

The use of universal jurisdiction by certain European courts to indict African leaders, especially
in Rwanda, started the general trend of opposition to the ICC among various states on the continent. This article does not discuss that important issue for space reasons.
N See AFP, 'Rwanda's Kagame says ICC Targeting Poor, African Countries,' 31 July 2008.
76) Reuters, 'Benin leader warns ICC against "harassing" Africans', 27 September 2008, online at:
<http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/16262.html> (visited 15 May 2009).
77) As will be seen through the discussion in this article, instead of being a foreign imposition, the
ICC was actually invited to investigate three of the four African situations by Uganda, the CAR and
the DRC. Only the Sudan investigation was imposed by the Security Council. Moreover, it is noteworthy that other African countries, such as the Ivory Coast, a non-party, was reportedly lobbying
for the referral of its own situation to the ICC. It even lodged a declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor
of the ICC', 16 July 2003.
71) The ICC Prosecutor applied for arrests warrants for Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali
Muhammad Abd-AI-Rahman (aka Ali Kushayb) in May 2007. In addition, the first summons to
appear to ever be issued by the Court was made public in May 2009 in respect of Bahr Idriss Abu
Garda, an alleged rebel leader in Darfur, who is scheduled to appear for confirmation hearings on
three charges of war crimes against on 12 October 2009.
79) ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Press Release, 'ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir,
President of Sudan', 4 March 2009; Situation in Darfiir,Sudan (ICC-02/05-157) 'Public Redacted
Version of Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 filed on 28 July 2008', Pre-Trial Chamber,
12 September 2008; Prosecutorv. OmarAlBasbir(ICC-02/05-157), 'Decision on the Prosecution's
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir', Pre-Trial Chamber I,
4 March 2009 and 'Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir', Pre-Trial Chamber I,
4 March 2009.
74)
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Among the more contentious issues, even before the Bashir warrant was
approved by the Pre-Trial Chamber, lawyers debated the accuracy of the
Prosecutor's characterization of his alleged criminal conduct in Darfur as genocide and whether, or not, the President's immunities would evaporate if the
arrest warrant is issued. 80 Others considered whether an indictment unlikely to
be executed in the short-term is pragmatic prosecutorial strategy in the longterm, and even the propriety of a Security Council deferral - as requested by
African leaders within the AU framework. 8' For their part, previous international
prosecutors have rallied to publicly support the seemingly embattled MorenoOcampo.82
Even more significant to the future of the ICC as a young institution was the
political reaction within regional organizations. In particular, following the
Prosecutor's application for an arrest warrant for President Bashir, the PSC of the
AU, the primary decision-making organ for conflict resolution in Africa, immediately called on the UN Security Council to deploy Article 16 of the Rome
Statute to "defer the process initiated by the ICC." 3 In a number of strongly
worded decisions, the AU observed that while it endorses criminal accountability

The UN Darfur Commission, chaired by the first ICTY President Antonio Cassese, concluded
that the crimes in Darfur did not reveal the specific intent to commit genocide. This immediately
spawned a debate. After the Prosecutor's public application for an arrest warrant, commentators
questioned whether Bashir's alleged crimes amounted to genocide. See, e.g., A. T Cayley, 'The
Prosecutor's Strategy in Seeking the Arrest of Sudanese President Al Bashir on Charges of Genocide',
6 JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice (2008) 829-840 and A. de Waal, 'Darfur, the Court and
Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation', in N. Waddell and P Clark (eds.), Courting
Conflict?Justice,Peace and the ICC in Africa (London: The Royal Africa Society, 2008). In its decision approving the arrest warrant, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that the information supplied
by the ICC Prosecutor did not show reasonable grounds to believe that the Sudanese government
acted with specific intent to destroy, in whole on in part, the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups.
Charges for genocide were therefore not included for the arrest warrant. Nonetheless, the Chamber
left a window open for an amendment or modification in light of any new information submitted
subsequently under Art. 58(6) ICCSt. See Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Bashir
Arrest Warrant, supra note 79, at paras. 206-208.
")C Gosnell, 'The Request for an Arrest Warrant in Al Bashir', 6 Journalof InternationalCriminal
Justice (2008) 841-851 and A. Ciampi 'The Proceedings Against President Al Bashir and the
Prospects of their Suspension Under Article 16 ICC Statute', 6 Journalof InternationalCriminal
Justice (2008) 885-897.
")For example, see R. Goldstone, 'Catching A War Criminal in the Act', The New York
Times, 15 July 2008 and L. Arbour, 'Justice v. Politics', InternationalHerald Tribune, 16 September
2008.
"3)
AU Peace and Security Council Decision (PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII)), 21 July 2008, paras. 3,
5, 9, 11 (i); AU Assembly Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court
Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan (Dec. 221 (XII),
3 February 2009, paras. 2, 3 and Peace and Security Council Decision (PSC/PR/Comm (CLXXV)),
5 March 2009, paras. 4-6. See also AU Press Statement, 'The Chairperson of the Commission
Expresses Deep Concern at the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal
Court on Darfur', 4 March 2009.
8")
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for gross human rights violations, given the "delicate nature" of the processes currently underway in the Sudan, the search for justice should be pursued in a way
that complements, rather than impedes, efforts to secure a lasting peace in the
country. It also noted that ICC jurisdiction is based on complementarity and
underscored that a prosecution in the current climate "may not be in the interest
of the victims and justice" because it could lead to greater destabilization in Sudan
and the region.84
While it has been suggested that there is in fact no peace process in Darfur, the
AU apparently sees the ICC on a collision course with its own peacemaking
efforts.85 Tanzanian President Jakaya M. Kikwete, speaking for the continent,
publicly reiterated that "Justice has to be done. Just must be seen to be done.
What the AU is simply saying is that what is critical, what is the priority, is
peace."8 6 The AU has therefore begun to lobby the support of other regional bodies, including the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Conference
and the Non Aligned Movement, ostensibly to rein in the ICC. Likely because of
Sudanese backroom lobbying, all those organizations had for their own reasons
already, or have since, publicly joined the AU chorus singing down the wisdom
of indicting President Bashir at this time.8 7 This opposition will likely continue in
the near future given the recent assumption of the AU chairperson position by
erstwhile Sudanese ally and self-proclaimed anti-colonialist, President Muammar
Gaddafi of Libya.

6. Accountability for International Crimes and the Logic of Mutual Gain
and Mutual Vulnerability
Accountability for international crimes is not a matter of concern only to the UN
or the international community. Indeed, the prosecution of serious international
crimes is of concern to all African states - at least, if we take their concrete actions
on the responsibility to protect within the AU setting at face value. At the level of
The AU has been seeking a peaceful resolution to the Darfur crisis, and as part of this, deployed
the first hybrid peacekeeping force between the UN and a regional organization to Sudan in July
2007 pursuant to SC Res. 1769, 31 July 2007.
85) Goldstone, supra note 82 (arguing, inter alia, that '[s]o far, there has been no Darfur peace process to speak of.')
86) Reuters, 'AU chairman backs Sudan's Bashir over court', 8 September 2008, online at: <http://
www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL8101824> (visited 15 May 2009).
87) For e.g., see 'OIC Secretary General [Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu] strongly rejects the ICC indictment
against President of the Sudan', 4 March 2009 (expressing his disappointment over the Bashir indictment; warning that it could lead to 'dangerous ramifications' ; rejecting the 'kind of selectivity and
double standards applied by the international community' in addressing international crimes and
appealing to the Security Council to 'suspend the move by the ICC in the interest of the ongoing
peace efforts in the Sudan') and 'Statement of the Extra-ordinary session of the Ministerial Council
of the League of Arab States to examine the Developments in Darfur Region', 8 August 2008.
84)
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individual countries, we also see indications of that desire. Perhaps the best examples of this commitment to address impunity are the SCSL and the ICTR.
Though funded by the international community, the formal requests for their
establishment originated from Freetown and Kigali respectively.
Senegalese authorities have also been at the forefront of controversial efforts,
which recently reached the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to exercise
universal jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed in Chad by former President Hiss~ne Habr. 88 No less important have been efforts by Ethiopia's high
courts to try former military leaders, namely, Mengistu Haile Mariam. Other
African countries, for example, Burundi have long campaigned for international support for a special tribunal. Similarly, in Liberia, civil society organizations are increasingly agitating for the prosecution of international crimes to
supplement the work of the local truth commission. The lack of political support
from the government for such a tribunal makes it highly unlikely. 89 Nonetheless,
the trend towards ensuring individual accountability in Africa has continued
with the most recent proposal being for an internationalized Special Tribunal for
Kenya to prosecute those bearing greatest responsibility for post election violence following disputed multi-party elections. This is in addition to the increasing practice of prosecuting serious crimes in various types of African national
90
courts.
From the international community point of view, enhancing accountability for
serious international crimes is the core justification for the permanent Court. In
this regard, we may recall the statement of Judge PhillipeKirsch, then President of
the ICC, in his speech to the AU on 17 June 2006 that "without Africa the ICC
would not exist as it does today; and because of the relationship between the
Court and African States, cooperation with the [AU] is particularly important to

")Report

of the Committee of Eminent African Juristson the Case of Hissine Habri,(Addis Ababa,
AU: 2006) online at: <http://www.hrw.org/justice/habreCEJARepor0506.pdf> (visited 15 May
2009); AU Assembly Decision (Dec. 127(VII)), 2 July 2006 (mandating Senegal 'to prosecute and
ensure that Hiss~ne Habr6 is tried, on behalf of Africa, by a competent Senegalese court with guarantees for fair trial') and Dec. 240(XII), 3 February 2009 (urging African and other states to contribute funds to the budget established for the case to enable its prosecution). See also ICJ, Press
Release No. 2009/13, 'Belgium institutes proceedings against Senegal and requests the Court to
indicate provisional measures', 19 February 2009, online at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
144/15052.pdf>; Press Release No. 2009/14, 'Proceedings instituted by the Kingdom of Belgium
against the Republic of Senegal Request for the indication of provisional measures', 12 March
2009, online at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/15092.pdf (visited 15 May 2009).
8') C.Jalloh andA. Marong, 'Ending Impunity: The Case for War Crimes Trials in Liberia' 2 African
JournalofLegal Studies (2005) 53-79 (arguing that the political will did not exist for an internationally supported special court for Liberia; suggesting instead that the SCSL be mandated to prosecute
international crimes committed there).
%)J Rikhof 'Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions on
International Impunity', I CriminalLaw Forum (2009) 1-51 (reviewing domestic prosecutions in,
among others, Africa).
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the Court."9 ' The Prosecutor, Registrar and some judges have all acknowledged
the importance of this evolving relationship. 92
Essentially, both Africa and the ICC have much to gain from each other. This,
in my view, entails two distinct but mutually reinforcing aspects embedded in
the Rome Statute and the AU's Constitutive Act as well as the Peace and
Security Protocol. In the first place, all three instruments conceive of the prevention of international crimes as a fundamental objective. This is evident from
even a cursory reading of their respective preambles. Secondly, where the Court's
and Africa's efforts fail to yield prevention outcomes and certain international
offences are in fact committed, the substantive provisions provide for the punishment of the key perpetrators of such crimes. The two regimes are therefore conjoined by the shared belief that prosecution of international offences
would likely deter others from committing such crimes in the future. Against
this backdrop of their respective objectives and mandates, it seems rather obvious that collaboration would offer Africa and the ICC mutual gain and that
there would be lost opportunities and a "mutual vulnerability" should they fail
to do so.
6.1. A "Win- Win"for the InternationalCriminal Court
While perhaps evident to international lawyers, this point nevertheless needs to
be made and emphasized given the apparent unpopularity of the Court within
certain African circles. Cooperation between African countries and the ICC to
battle impunity offers a "win-win" prospect for a new court struggling to find its
feet and place in the world, and on the other hand, is a blessing for a continent
in search of a sustainable peace after centuries of violence and turmoil. With its
current four investigations in Africa, the Court will gain significant benefits if it
successfully prosecutes its maiden cases in fair trials meeting the highest standards
of international justice. In this way it would prove itself as a functional and effective court of law.
The importance of this to the ICC cannot be overemphasized. This is particularly so considering that, as one commentator has noted, it was established over
6 years ago, has spent over $600 million dollars, and only has 4 accused in its
93
custody while 7 (now 8) of its 12 (now 13) arrest warrants remain outstanding.
After legendary difficulties over disclosure, the sole Lubanga trial finally got

9')As quoted by Kambudzi, supra note 61, at 43.
92)

See, e.g., Judge N. Pillay, 'The rise of the International Criminal Court: complementarity and

domestic prosecution of international crimes' in M. du Plessis and A. Louw (eds.), The Investigation
and Prosecution of'core internationalcrimes'andthe role ofthe InternationalCriminalCourt in Africa
(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007) pp. 13-22, at 13-14.
9 Ciampi,supra note 81, at 892.
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underway in early 2009. 9' In this context, the Court is now at a crucial stage of
its existence where it strongly needs to achieve and to show tangible judicial
results. 9" The benefits of such success for its work and reputation would be
immense.
Without attempting to be exhaustive, to begin with, fair and independent trials will boost state confidence in the ICC as a new institution and perhaps even
generate more referrals and ratifications from other countries in Africa and elsewhere. This would help to advance the Prosecutor's apparent preference for selfreferrals in selecting situations. Crucially, if it shows independence and effectiveness, the Court will likely reassure the skeptical but powerful holdout states,
such as the U.S., China and India, who between themselves constitute well over
half of the world population, that it can discharge its mandate effectively and
thereby merits their support. This will help it to not only achieve universal reach,
but to also transform or co-opt superpower opposition to its work to its advantage. As the world's most powerful state seeks to climb back to a position of
moral leadership of the world, that country will have much to offer the ICC
whenever it becomes a State Party.96 These include American technical, financial,
diplomatic and other support - similar to the kind it quietly offers the ad hoc
tribunals.
Second, as various recitals of the Rome Statute preamble confirm, the ICC was
intended to address atrocities that "deeply shock the conscience of humanity'
based on the recognition "that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security
and well-being of the world." Indeed states resolved that the "most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" must not go unpunished. They also affirmed that responsibility for prosecution of such crimes
requires that measures be taken at the national level and through international
cooperation. Thus, crucially and unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the Court only possesses secondary jurisdiction vis-a-vis the primary jurisdiction of states. This is
entrenched through the complementarity principle. The underlying logic of
that principle is that the permanent court must supplement the work of national
jurisdictions; hence, it can only exercise jurisdiction when states prove to be
unwilling or unable to prosecute. In this way, complementarity enables the ICC
to give effect to states' collective determination "to put an end to impunity" for
the perpetrators of international crimes and "thus to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes."97

9') H. Stuart, 'The ICC in Trouble', 6 Journalof InternationalCriminalJustice (2008) (discussing

the stay of proceedings in the Lubanga case and the disclosure debacle).
Ciampi, supra note 81, at 892.
96) D. Scheffer et al., 'The End of Exceptionalism in War Crimes: The International Criminal Court
and America's Credibility in the World', HarvardInternationalReview, 21 November 2007.
97 Emphasis added.
95)
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As Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has rightly observed, the consequence of
complementarity is that:
the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the
contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of
national institutions, would be a major success. 8

Hence, from the Court's prism, if African countries conduct fair and effective
national prosecutions, it offers a key advantage in that it will allow it to in turn
focus on the high ranking accused deemed to be "most responsible" or "bearing
greatest responsibility" for international crimes in other parts of the world. Under
this model, the ICC and African states could carve an informal division of labor
whereby the affected countries undertake prosecution of lower and middle ranking suspects while leaving ranking perpetrators, the ostensible "big fish", to international investigation and prosecution. This is the mandate and also stated goal
of the Prosecutor who has affirmed that he will only pursue those holding leadership positions but warned about an "impunity gap" if national authorities fail
to deploy other means to bring lower tier persons to justice."' In practice, this
consensual division of labor appears to have been the informal understanding
reached between him and DRC authorities.'0° The more difficult question is
whether this can be done in a manner that does not effectively confer immunity
from prosecution to the government, as opposed, to the rebel or opposition
side. O'
Third, it will obviously be less costly for the Court if African countries can
prosecute their own genocidairesand war criminals. This is particularly important
considering the substantial funds required to hold trials thousands of miles away
from the crime base in a faraway European city (The Hague). This issue is more
important than might first appear, even for the relatively rich ICC. One example
from the experience of the SCSL with the trial of former Liberian President
Charles Taylor will suffice to illustrate the point.
Following his arrest, a highly controversial decision was made to change the
venue of the trial from Sierra Leone to the Netherlands for security reasons. 102
The Prosecution case formally commenced on 4 June 2007, but because of serious

") ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor',
September 2003, at 4.
99) Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 98, at 3.
"o) ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Statement of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to Diplomatic
Corps', 12 February 2004, at 4.
101)Schabas, 'Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism', supra note 21, at 752.
102) Jalloh, 'The Law and Politics of the Charles Taylor Case', supra note 35 and C C. Jalloh, 'Special
Court for Sierra Leone Dismisses Taylor Motion for Change of Venue', 10 American Society of
InternationalLaw Insights 15 (15 June 2006), online at: <http://www.asil.org/insights060615.cfm>
(visited 15 May 2009).

C.C Jaloh/ InternationalCriminalLaw Review 9 (2009) 445-499

difficulties relating to provision of adequate counsel for the Accused, only had
witnesses testifying as of 7 January 2008. After calling 91 witnesses, the Prosecution
closed its case on 30 January 2009. Around the same time, media reports indicated that the tribunal's donations have dried up and that Taylor may be released
due to lack of funds - even before entering his defence. 103 Admittedly, the financial woes dogging the SCSL are not new. The UN, which has in the past stepped
in to address anticipated donor shortfalls, may also provide a subvention grant.
Among the reasons are that it cannot afford to lose credibility by allowing a closure of the tribunal under such circumstances.
Be that as it may, the decision to try Taylor in The Hague, The Netherlands,
rather than in Freetown, Sierra Leone, exponentially multiplied the costs of the
trial - as foreshadowed by this commentator. 04 For example, substantial additional funds had to be generated for the already cash strapped court to establish
and maintain a miniature version of the SCSL in The Hague, to hire and pay salaries of approximately 100 staff members, to fly in and sustain witnesses, mostly
from West Africa, in a rented safe house, to lease and retrofit a courtroom from
the ICC and to bear the costs of hosting Mr. Taylor at the Scheveningen Detention

Facility. 105
Perhaps more importantly, aside from saving funds that could then be diverted
to compensate victims of international crimes, in situ prosecutions will give
Africans the opportunity to witness their tormentors being brought to justice.
Based on the experience of the first generation UN tribunals, this is now widely
acknowledged to be an important goal for international criminal justice. By
exposing the truth about the atrocities committed to locals, it could assist victims
in their healing and may contribute to reconciliation in the long-term. From an
ICC perspective, this may resolve growing complaints about the extent of national
participation in its processes because of a geographic divorce between the accused,
the crime and victim base and the formal seat of the court and trials in The
Hague.
Finally, encouraging national prosecution would be a pragmatic decision
for the Court that would enhance efficiency because it simply cannot address
every meritorious situation. Besides, states are usually the best placed to address
103 K Manson, 'Lack of funds may mean Liberia's Taylor freed - prosecutor' <http://www.reuters
.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLO563309> (visited 15 May 2009).
104) Jalloh, 'The Contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone', supra note 64, at 204 (identifying funding as the first of two big challenges that would confront the SCSL when it relocated the
Taylor trial to The Hague).
(05) The agreement between the SCSL and the ICC provides for the former to pay to the latter, in
advance, for all services, facilities and support provided to it. These included courtroom and detention services. See Arts. 3, 5 and 18 of the Memorandum of UnderstandingRegardingAdministrative
Arrangements between the InternationalCriminalCourtand the Special Courtfor SierraLeone in C.C.
Jalloh (ed.), Consolidated Legal Texts for the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone (Leiden and Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 125-136, at 127-128, 135.
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international crimes from a criminal process point of view. Indeed, while perhaps
cynical in light of the continent's strong role in the development of many of the
international criminal justice mechanisms discussed above, some observers have
argued that the Court is now giving Africa the courage necessary to face up to
its dark past. It is apparently also now beginning to get past the sense of victimhood that long justified an aggressive anti-colonial agenda. In the result, it has
been suggested, a ripple effect of the ICC that is already been felt is to show that
"black on black" violence is no more acceptable morally and legally than "white
06
on black violence". 1
6.2. A "Win-Win"for Africa
With a strong, impartial and effective ICC, Africa is likely to be an even bigger
beneficiary of a solid relationship with it. First, at the regional level, African governments can better achieve the broader good governance and rule of law objectives outlined in the AU's constitutive instruments, especially the ambitious and
proactive conflict prevention and management system anticipated by the Peace
and Security Protocol. This will enhance the ability of the region to continue
blazing the trail in implementing the responsibility to protect.
Second, the Court can assist African governments to build capacity in the
prosecution of serious international crimes within their domestic tribunals. In
fact, the Prosecutor has indicated that he will enter into cooperation arrangements with national counterparts to assist in capacity-building to fulfill a key
objective of the Rome Statute, that is, to ensure local prosecutions of international crimes based on the complementarity principle. 0 7 To the extent that this
policy is backed up with action, the spin off effects could be to strengthen domestic criminal legislation in African countries and to perhaps enhance the ability of
national justice systems to deliver more credible justice. For example, Uganda's
current Director of Public Prosecutions has argued that in certain areas like witness protection, poorer countries are least able to undertake extensive programs
that would give the protections required to convince critical witnesses, who
often fear reprisals, to testify' 0 8 He suggested that the ICC could draw on the
") K Chitiyo and L. Devlin, 'The International Criminal Court and Africa', 28 The Royal United
Services Institute Newsbrief 8 (2008) 67-70, at 69.
Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 98, at 5.
108)A Buteera, 'Best practices and challenges encountered when prosecuting and investigating
107)

international crimes in Uganda', in M. du Plessis andA. Louw (eds.), The InvestigationandProsecution
of 'core internationalcrimes' and the role of the InternationalCriminal Court in Africa (Pretoria:
Institute for Security Studies, 2007) pp. 57-67, at 65. Another example of the challenges faced by
African countries in ensuring adequate witness protection and the impact of that on potential witnesses' ability to testify recently arose in respect of applications for the transfer of genocide cases to

Rwanda for trial. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyurikiga (ICTR-2002-78-R1 Ibis), Trial
Chamber, 'Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda', 6 June 2008,
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experience and expertise of the ad hoc international courts to provide technical
assistance on witness protection to national judicial systems. °9
'Third, and perhaps more fundamentally from a concerned African government
perspective, an enhanced capacity to claim their first right to prosecute the international crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court may be the best weapon in
their arsenal to counter any attempts to encroach on their state sovereignty. In
fact, to counter the Prosecutor's alleged overemphasis on situations in the continent, African leaders are better off looking to the future to start building the
necessary criminal justice systems that would enable them to fulfill their treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute. In many ways, theirs and the ICC's objective
of encouraging action at the national level to mete out accountability would be
better achieved through such concrete steps than making dramatic allegations in
the media.
Furthermore, assuming prosecutions have some deterrent effects, strong legal
systems may ultimately not only help prevent or minimize the phenomenon of
international crimes within African countries, they would serve to deprive the
Court of jurisdiction. Of course, this will help ensure that their willingness, and
more importantly ability, to punish such crimes is beyond reproach in an Article
17 of the Rome Statute "unwilling or unable genuinely" assessment. Moreover,
while ICC-style criminal justice has great promise, a "one size fits all" approach
to counter impunity is unlikely to work in all situations given the variety of challenges confronting African and other nations experiencing conflict. This is compounded by the reality that some governments may legitimately need policy room
to fashion solutions to ensure accountability in line with local realities, preferences, cultures and traditional justice mechanisms.
But it is noteworthy that in as much as African governments have been quick
to try and convict the Court for paying too much attention to their problems
(despite having invited it to do so in three out of four situations through "selfreferrals"), civil society on the continent has not been as vocal in condemning the
permanent court. If anything, it tends to be supportive of the ICC." ° Indeed,
some have applauded the Court for forcing Africa to confront its governance and

paras. 63-81, 104; affirmed by the Appeals Chamber in 'Decision on the Prosecution's Appeal
Against Decision on Referral under Rule I Ibis', 30 October 2008; Prosecutor v. Ildephonse
Hategekimana(ICTR-00-55-R1 Ibis), Trial Chamber, 'Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Referral
of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to the Republic of Rwanda,' 19 June 2008, paras. 61-71;
affirmed by the Appeals Chamber in 'Decision on the Prosecution's Appeal against Decision on
Referral under Rule 11 bis', 4 December 2008.
'" ' Buteera, supra note 108, at 65.
For instance, see Darfur Consortium, Press Release, 'Bashir warrant: a major step towards justice for victims in Darfur', 4 March 2009, online at: <http://www.darfurconsortium.org> (visited
15 May 2009). The consortium is a coalition of more than 50-Africa based and Africa-focused
NGOs dedicated to a 'sustainable solution' to the human rights crisis in Darfur.
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justice demons and for seeking to end the so-called "tradition of big man" impunity"."' Given the current democracy deficit on the continent, the gap between
the concerns expressed by African politicians and local populations is hardly surprising. Indeed, it may reflect the sad reality that the selfish interests of many
undemocratic Third World governments, including quite a few in Africa, are not
necessarily coextensive with or in sync with those of their citizens. Certainly, in
some countries on the continent, the populations clamor for change while their
leaders do everything to cling to power. One might cite the example of Zimbabwe,
whose President Robert Mugabe, seems intent on doing whatever is necessary,
including the alleged commission of torture and disappearances, so that he can
2
continue to rule.'
Fourth, from the perspective of conflict torn African countries, the benefits of
a strong and effective ICC may extend well beyond trials of those most responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It might ultimately
be addressing the substantive crime of aggression. The Court will not try individuals for that crime until it is defined as per Articles 121 (addressing amendments) and 123 (review) of the Rome Statute. Yet, progress reports on such a
definition suggest that one might eventually be agreed by states - even if much
later than within the relatively short time period initially envisaged. Once that
happens, it could offer a significant benefit in the fight against the scourge of
conflict - a matter that we have already seen is of grave concern to Africa.
It seems true that in the conflicts on the continent nowadays, aggressors tend
to be other African states, acting directly or through proxy rebel groups, instead
of others further afield - as was the case historically. A good example of this is the
ongoing conflicts in the Great Lakes region in which a number of states in the
East and Central Africa sub-regions have been implicated. A similar situation
arose in West Africa in relation to the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the
Horn of Africa as well as in southern Africa. These examples suggest that the value
the continent should attach to the idea of subjecting the crime of aggression to
prosecution should be high. If this is so, it may well be that the biggest benefit
that the Rome Statute confers on Africa is yet to come - particularly considering
the number of ongoing conflicts on the continent at any given time.
Viewed in this context, this may not be the right time for African states to
opt out of the international criminal justice system hinged on the ICC. Indeed,
they could channel their obvious concerns with current prosecutorial practice

Chitiyo and Devlin, supra note 106, at 69.
Among others, there have been many allegations of torture, disappearances and killings of
members of the political opposition, civil society activists and student leaders by government security forces with impunity. See, e.g., United States Department of State, 2008 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices,Zimbabwe, 25 February 2009, online at: < http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2008/af/l 19032.htm> (visited 15 May 2009).
II)

Is)
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through filings of legal briefs before the judges of the Court or within the more
political framework of the Assembly of States Parties. In other words, it is perhaps
in the numerous wars within Africa that individual countries may benefit the
most from the ICC by leveraging its power to limit, if not minimize, the number
of likely wars on their territories. Of course, the important assumption being
that a definition of the crime will lead to its prosecution which, in turn, would
help deter at least some leaders in the future from sponsoring aggression against
other states.
This will obviously not only be to Africa's advantage. For the international
community as well, a definition of the crime of aggression, which is taking place
within the framework of an ICC working group in which African nations are
represented, will help develop the jus ad bellum, the law on the use of force,
thereby bringing it closer than ever before to achieving the objective in the first
paragraph of the UN Charter preamble to save succeeding generations of humanity from the scourge of war. That this is an issue that preoccupies many less powerful nations is confirmed by the fact that it is the nonaligned countries, perhaps
the largest issue bloc in the world, which pushed for the inclusion of aggression
in the Rome Statute." 3 While because of initial definitional disagreements the
crime is not yet prosecutable, it is to be hoped that the current divergence of
views, including regarding the role of the Security Council in triggering prosecutions, will ultimately be resolved in a manner that reflects Africa's interest.114
Given the series of internecine conflicts on the continent, success with a definition will likely give even more impetus to the remaining African signatories to file
the outstanding ratifications to the Rome Statute. It may also encourage other
nations harbouring similar concerns, on the continent but also elsewhere in the
developing world, to accede to the treaty.
Fifth, the Rome Statute bridged an important regulatory gap in international
humanitarian law whereby war crimes committed in "international" armed conflicts were privileged over those of a "non-international" character. In international conflicts, states had a duty to prosecute or extradite those who violate the
"grave breaches" provisions of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Whereas in
internal conflicts, states had no corresponding obligation in respect of the conduct that common Article 3 sought to regulate. Indeed, the latter provision did
not establish criminal liability for such conduct. An attempt was made to expand
its scope of application in Additional Protocol II in 1977; however, the changes
that states ultimately adopted were limited.'' 5

113)

Schabas, An Introduction to the ICC, supra note 30, at 31.

114)

UN Department of Public Information, 'Press Conference on Special Working Group on

Crime of Aggression', 13 February 2009.
15) Schabas, An Introduction to the ICC,supra note 30, at 64.

C C.Jalloh / InternationalCriminalLaw Review 9 (2009) 445-499

Though Article 8 of the Rome Statute formally maintains this distinction
between international and non-international armed conflicts, it nevertheless
criminalizes in a single provision many of the more reprehensible acts committed
in both types of conflict. In effect, through this codification of the relevant war
crimes in a single place, it effectively renders the distinction nugatory in the legal
regime applicable before the ICC - the key site for future international prosecutions should states show a lack of fortitude or means to act. In addition, because
the provision captures the collective views of many states on the matter, it also
suggests that this distinction has become less germane to criminalization of
certain reprehensible acts under customary international humanitarian law as

well.

16

This may benefit all ICC States Parties since it perhaps heralds the death of an
archaic legal distinction which effectively imposed individual criminal responsibility for serious international humanitarian law violations based on the nature of
the underlying conflict, rather than the gravity of the underlying act. The travaux
prepratoires reveals that African delegations urged other states to eradicate this
distinction during the Rome negotiations. This position is exemplified by the
statement towards that end made by the representative of the 15 countries of the
Southern Africa Development Community." 7 It appears that those countries
were alive to the issue and the benefits of such a move for Africa since, as we saw
earlier, it continues to grapple with more conflicts than any other region in the
world. In this vein, it is interesting to note in passing that humanitarian law is
said to have established this division between types of conflicts partly because
of colonial power preoccupations to exempt from legal regulation the serious
violence used to suppress anti-colonialist resistance." 8 Indeed, to some, it is no
accident that despite the many atrocities committed against other peoples, international law failed to show any meaningful concern about prosecuting gross
human rights violations within a state until Europeans experienced the tragedy of
the Holocaust during the twentieth century."19
116)Prosecutorv. Dusko

Tadic (ICTY-94-1-AR-72), Appeals Chamber, 'Decision on the Defence

Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction', 2 October 1995, paras. 86-137 at 134 (concluding, inter alia, that 'customary international humanitarian law imposes criminal liability for serious
violations of common Article 3'). The authoritative ICRC commentary on customary international
humanitarian law cites two other treaties and contemporary state and international organization
practice to conclude that this is now a norm of customary international law. See J-M Henckaerts

and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw (Cambridge: CUP, 2005)
at Rules 151, 551-554.
117) H.E. A. M Omar, Minister for Justice (Head of South Africa's Delegation to the Rome
Negotiations) Statement at 2nd Plenary Meeting, 15 June 1998. See Official Records ofthe United

Nations DiplomaticConference of Plenipotentiarieson the Establishmentofan InternationalCriminal
Court, UN doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. 11)104, 65 at para. 15.
A. Anghie and B.S. Chimni, 'Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual
118)
Responsibility in Conflicts', 2 Chinese Journalof InternationalLaw (2003) at 88.
Ibid., supra note 118, at 88.
119)
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Sixth, the ICC's ability to prosecute international crimes may prove to be a
useful tool for African countries engaged in conflict as it could assist them to end
some of the long-running wars in the region. By "backstopping peace negotiations", 2 ° for instance, that between Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA), the Court may play a constructive role to restore peace in war ravaged
societies. Indeed, close cooperation between the Prosecutor and the concerned governments may nudge otherwise recalcitrant parties towards agreement,
especially in circumstances where a clear military victory by one of the parties to
the conflict seems elusive. In this regard, the notion that criminal prosecutions
were but a small part of the larger puzzle to secure or restore peace and stability
seemed to be consistent with the early views of Moreno-Ocampo.'2'
Of course, the Prosecutor should never promise a party to a conflict that he
will not prosecute. Nor should he align himself too closely to a particular government to compromise his independence and ability to prosecute their forces. Still,
where arrest warrants have been issued against rebel leaders in places like Uganda,
steps that are consistent with the broader goal of ending impunity could be taken.
The range of measures will necessarily differ, depending on the situation, but
could include listening to the views of the concerned communities and continuing to monitor the situation. He could then show flexibility in the use of his
power - keeping in mind the realities on the ground and the likelihood, or not,
of apprehending the suspects. Where merited, he could invoke the "interests of
justice" to cease an investigation or to re-evaluate a prior decision to prosecute
22
based on new facts or information.'
But the Court's current Prosecutor has rejected any such back-stopping function to peace deals. In respect of the Ugandan situation, for example, he stated
that because he is not a "party' to any peace process, he would not comment on
it or, for that matter, the content of any agreements. In other words, he would
insist on the law taking its course. If one adopts a positivist reading of the Rome
Statute, this position can hardly be faulted. At the same time, as difficult as it may
be for diehard internationalists to accept, in certain situations, the best interests
of the victims and justice may be to delay, stop or avoid prosecutions - at least
imminently.123 Otherwise, victims may wonder what will happen if a strict insistence on applying the letter of the law leads to patently absurd results.
Ironically, the same Prosecutor had, in discussing Article 53 of the Rome
Statute, noted that the "interests of justice" would require that the ICC play as
complementary a role as possible in the pursuit of broader justice goals.' 24 Still,

2, Kambudzi, supra note 43, at 37.

ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Fourth Session of the
Assembly of State Parties', 28 November - 3 December 2005 at 3.
122.)Arts. 53(2)(c) and 53(4) ICCSt (Initiation of an investigation).
123) ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice', September 2004, at 8.
121)

24') Ibid. at 8.
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he has gone on to maintain that the interests of justice are not necessarily the
same as the interests of peace, with the former falling within his domain and the
latter within that of other institutions, specifically, the Security Council. This
position is said to be problematic for seeking to define such a broad notion and,
in any event, is not grounded in the drafing history of the Rome Statute. It may
even constitute a form of unilateral and indirect amendment of the Court's
founding instrument because it may have upset the balance carefully struck by
states during the negotiations to build a measure of interpretative flexibility into
the system.'25 Whatever the case, if the Prosecutor turns a blind eye to the constraints faced by victims on the ground, he would likely undermine confidence
and goodwill towards his ongoing work in the Africa region.
In spite of this, the propriety, manner and extent of the ICC's involvement in
peace negotiations should be determined on a case-by-case basis. And in all cases,
it must be carefully managed so as to avoid undue difficulty, including actual or
perceived conflicts of interest, in pursing trials should negotiations fail and prosecutions ensue. In any event, in the Ugandan situation, the arrest warrants are
now like the sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of alleged LRA leaders,
in particular, Joseph Kony. The possibility that they can be enforced at anytime is
said to have motivated negotiation of a peace agreement. So far, none has been
finalized because of Kony's reported fears of being arrested. 2 6 Yet, such action on
the part of Moreno-Ocampo appear to be consonant with the complementarity
principle and, assuming a comprehensive peace accord is signed and proves durable, would not be against the long-term interests of the Court. Indeed, if it were
to play a constructive role to end the long and tragic conflict in northern Uganda,
the ICC could justifiably claim credit that its work had deterred further hostilities
and human rights atrocities in that nation. That some of the leaders of the victim
communities have expressed a preference to explore alternative forms of accountability and reconciliation, instead of prosecution and retribution, would clearly
strengthen his position.27
Related to this, the Court's work has raised concerns about the appropriate
balance between the need for individual criminal accountability to send a strong
signal against impunity and domestic amnesties where those become a necessary
precondition for the conclusion of a peace accord. For instance, but for the inclusion of what later proved to be a controversial blanket amnesty provision in
Article IX of the Lom6 Peace Agreement, the Revolutionary United Front rebels
would not have agreed to end the notoriously brutal war against the government

25) Schabas, 'Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism', supra note 21, at 749.
121)See, e.g., J. Gettleman, 'UN Envoy Meets with Ugandan Rebel', The New York Times, 13

November 2006 (reporting that the thorniest issue for Kony was the arrest warrants issued by the

ICC).
127) ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Press Release, 'Statements by ICC Chief Prosecutor and the visiting Delegation of Acholi leaders from northern Uganda', 18 March 2005.
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in Sierra Leone. 28 Indeed, where used properly, amnesties may help contribute to
the cessation of hostilities, reintegrate displaced civilians and former combatants
into society, and promote post-conflict reconciliation.
In Uganda, a bill was enacted granting a broad amnesty to all combatants
engaged in war since 26 February 1996.129 Certain classes of LRA members, who
allegedly committed crimes, were expected to benefit from this law. The ICC
Prosecutor has since clarified that he is only interested in those bearing greatest
responsibility. This means that he will only pursue alleged leaders such as Kony and
his cronies. A legal question that remains, however, is whether an amnesty granted
under Ugandan law could serve as a bar to prosecution of international crimes.
Under international law, there seems to be an emerging norm suggesting that
domestic amnesty laws do not bar international criminal tribunals from prosecuting international crimes. Pronouncements along these lines have been made by
various courts and bodies. 30 -he trouble is how does one enforce such a norm,
even assuming that it was universally agreed instead of contested? For the ICC,
this will likely be a challenge considering that, under complementarity, it only has
a right to a bite of the jurisdictional cherry if the state fails to bite. In other words,
it is uncertain what the Court can practically do in a situation where a referring
state - perhaps driven by domestic pressures for a political compromise - is prepared to offer an amnesty in return for peace to an individual alleged to have been
involved in the perpetration of international offences. The hard reality is that
even the ICC must rely on the goodwill and cooperation of national authorities
to perform even its most basic functions. It follows that a recalcitrant state could
put many practical obstacles to thwart its ability to investigate and prosecute cases
under such circumstances.
Finally, Africa can and should use the Court to continue spotlighting its
anti-impunity initiatives and agenda to advance the responsibility to protect. This
is particularly important given the fleeting attention span of a Security Council
2') Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone

Truth andReconciliation Commission, Vol. 1 (Freetown: TRC, 2004), Chapter I, at para. 17. See the
full text of the provision and the peace accord in Jalloh (ed.), ConsolidatedLegal Textsfor the Special

Courtfor Sierra Leone, supra note 105, 563-597 at 572.
"9)
Buteera, supra note 108, at 64.
130) See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, Brima Bazzy Kamara (SCSL-2004-15-PT), Appeals
Chamber, 'Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty', 13 March 2004 at para.
67 (concluding that 'a State cannot bring into oblivion and forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime
under international law, which other States are entitled to keep alive and remember.'); Report ofthe
Secretary-Generalon The Rule ofLaw and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and Post-ConflictSituations,
UN doc./S/2004/616 (2004) at para. 32 (stating that 'United Nations-endorsed peace agreements
can never promise amnesties for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations

of human rights.') and Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds.) Customary InternationalHumanitarian
Law, supra note 116, Rule 159 at 611-614 (citing state and Security Council practice in relation to
amnesties; explaining the ICRC view that Additional Protocol II cannot be interpreted as allowing
war criminals to escape prosecution).
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seemingly overwhelmed with global hot spots in a less then peaceful post-Cold
War world. With an engaged ICC, the continent could more easily generate the
necessary international interest and assistance in resolving its human security
nightmares. As the tragic example of Rwanda's genocide showed in 1994, Africa
cannot take for granted that security concerns within its own backyard are necessarily a top priority for the UN and the international community - even when
those matters fall squarely within the contours of Article 39 of the UN Charter.
It may be recalled that African leaders decried the Security Council decision to
downgrade, instead of increase, the mandate and capabilities of the UN Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) as the genocide, in which close to an estimated
one million people were ultimately killed, was unfolding in that country between
April and July 1994. Before the resolution reducing the size of UNAMIR was
adopted by the Security Council, the OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed
Salim warned that the international community would be turning its back on the
people of that country and Africa at a time when the UN was rightly redoubling
its efforts to protect human lives in other parts of the world. 3 ' The then Tanzanian
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the primary facilitator of the Rwandan peace process, presciently observed just days after the resolution downscaling UNAMIR
was adopted that it was perhaps "one of the most unfortunate" decisions ever
taken by the Security Council, which stood in "sharp contrast" to the level of UN
engagement elsewhere.' 32 Given such a context, African leaders, who at once
would complain if the international community did not pay attention to crises
exercising the continent, will risk losing credibility if, now that they have its
attention at the level of the Court and, for that matter the UN (in respect of
Sudan at least), they protest about too much interest in the myriad challenges
confronting the continent.

7. Some Key Challenges for the ICC-Africa Relationship
There are broadly two types of challenges for the ICC and Africa as they seek to

build a solid and mutually beneficial relationship for the future. Though they
overlap, I have grouped them into two categories: legal and political. Generally,
as we shall see in due course, some of these are not issues unique to the Court and
its relationship with the continent. Rather, they concern the nature of international criminal law and the growth of the ICC as a new institution. This is partly

because the international criminal justice regime centered on the Court is still
131) For an in-depth discussion and the relevant statements and documents, see UN, The United
Nations andRwanda: 1993-1996(UN Blue Books Series, Vol. X, New York: United Nations, Dept.
of Public Information, 1996) at 42 and 266-267.
12) The United Nations and Rwanda, supra note 131, at 46 and 273.
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new, and aspects of it are still widely misunderstood or contested by differently
situated groups, actors and interests.
An additional complication may arise from the reality that the new international criminal law occupies terrain previously hegemonized by sovereignty
which, in turn, structured the Westphalian international legal order that exists
today. As sovereignty's hegemony is contested, new actors, hitherto non-players at
the international level, seek to make their voices heard. In this environment,
nascent international institutions such as the ICC, which are at the front-line of
international society's battle to roll back certain aspects of sovereignty, may open
themselves to criticism. Criticism is not in and of itself bad, provided that it is
constructive. The Court, as a new body, should embrace the constructive criticism that it receives and, to the extent possible, address it. This will help establish
its credibility and legitimacy as a serious player in the international arena. In this
regard, the ICC, like other multilateral treaty-based international organizations,
such as the World Trade Organization which belatedly realized this after the Doha
Round of negotiations stalled because developing country concerns were largely
ignored, should be mindful that, in the long term, it would not be in its best
interests to ignore legitimate concerns of the majority of its State Parties. This is
so in relation to a host of issues, but especially questions about the timing and
sequencingof prosecutions, vis-a-vis peace negotiations, which will no doubt arise
in future situations.
7.1. Legal Challenges
Some of the current tension between the ICC and Africa has been exacerbated by
the emergence of new legal principles whose implications remain uncertain. Some
of these relate to controversies emanating from the maiden application of the
Court's internal legal framework, primarily the Rome Statute, to African situations, while others betray concerns about some seemingly unsettled principles of
international law more generally. In some cases, the former are moulded by the
latter and vice versa. Overall, these issues tend to put the ICC under the spotlight
of criticism within and outside Africa, at times, specifically calling into question
the propriety of certain decisions taken by some of its principal officials. This section of the article will examine a number of these legal issues. In highlighting
them, I suggest that the more these uncertainties are settled, the less controversial
ICC actions on the continent will likely become. In turn, African countries are
more likely to reinvest seemingly lost confidence in the Court's legal regime and
to rely on it to address the current accountability gap.
7.1.1. State consent andICCjurisdictionover nationals of non-parties
In the first group of concerns are general issues of jurisdiction which feature
prominently now similar to the way they did during the years leading up to the
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adoption of the Rome Statute. In this respect, a particularly contentious point
has been whether the ICC can assert jurisdiction over the nationals of nonparties. This problem flows from a primary rule of international law under which
consent is the basis for states' assumption of international obligations. This norm
is well established in customary international law and is underscored by the
VCLT. 13 3 The issue of "State consent" was hotly debated during the Rome negotiations, and again, has resurfaced in the context of the Security Council referral
of Sudan to the Court. 134 Some countries, including the affected state, have
argued that the ICC's assertion of jurisdiction was a violation of its sovereignty.
This may be a good political argument. But it is not as firmly grounded in the law
as might first appear. Why?
Under the Rome Statute, the Court's jurisdiction can extend over the nationals
of a non-party like Sudan in three limited circumstances. 135 First, where the
crimes are committed by a national of a non-party within the territory of a State
Party - which is obviously not the case here. 136 Second, where the non-party
decides to lodge a declaration accepting the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction (again
not applicable to the Sudan situation). 37 Third, where the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers a non-party situation to the
Prosecutor in accordance with Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. TIhrough admittedly limited practice, this power to adopt measures aimed at restoring international peace and security is now said to include creating special tribunals to
prosecute international crimes - as was done in relation to the ICTY and ICTR
in the early nineties. Be that as it may, states are deemed to have expressed consent to such coercive action based on the binding nature of Article 39.138 Sudan,
like other UN Member States, had accepted to implement such decisions pursuant

'33) 'hat foundational convention notes, inter alia, that 'the principle of free consent' is 'universally
recognized'. See VCLT, supra note 17, preambular para. 3.
134) Ironically, this power to assert jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties isone of the major factors that led the United States to refuse to sign on to the Rome Statute at its adoption in Rome in
July 1998. Just years later, it participated in Security Council debates that led to a referral under
which that very argument was deployed to ground ICC jurisdiction against another state (Sudan).
It only abstained from the vote, having secured an immunity exception from ICC jurisdiction for

its peacekeepers. See D. J Scheffer, 'The United States and the International Criminal Court', 93
American JournalofInternationalLaw (1999) 14; R. Wedgwood, 'The International Criminal Court:
An American View', 10 EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw (1999) 93-107.
'1-)
For an excellent analysis, see D. Akande, 'The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits', I Journalof InternationalCriminalJustice
(2003) 618-650.
136) Art. 12(2) (a) ICCSt (Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction).
117) Art. 12(3) ICCSt (Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction).
131) Art. 39 of the UN Charter provides: The Security Council shall determine the existence of the
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
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to Article 25 of the UN Charter. As the Security Council's referral is based on
Chapter VII authority and Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, this is not as valid
a criticism of the ICC.
Still, this answer remains somewhat unsatisfactory in that a strong argument
can be made that the use of this power to assert criminal jurisdiction could not
have been contemplated when Sudan signed on to the UN Charter.3 9 One might
even challenge whether such a far reaching and highly intrusive power would
have been voluntarily ceded by new and sovereignty conscious states, surfing the
high waves of nationalism and decolonization, to an international organization in
the immediate aftermath of World War II. This is particularly so considering that
almost all those same states put the idea of a permanent penal court on hold for
almost 50 years. Furthermore, when they finally warmed up to it, they felt it
necessary to negotiate a new multilateral treaty to establish such a tribunal, instead
of creating one through an amendment of the UN Charter. They certainly did
not also choose to authorize the Security Council to so do on their behalf using
its extraordinary Chapter VII authority.
Secondly, the power to assert such jurisdiction is being invoked in the face of
persistent objections by the relevant state (Sudan), which is reported to have even
contemplated withdrawal from the post-world War II UN collective security
regime to undercut the Court's claim to jurisdiction through the Security
Council. 140 This has obviously not transpired. But it does illustrate how far some
third states might be willing to go to register their fundamental disagreement
with ICC's extension of criminal jurisdiction over their nationals in what to them
may appear tantamount to a wholesale re-writing of the fundamentally consensual basis of international treaty law.
Thirdly, besides questions of legality, the legitimacy of the use of the Chapter
VII power in a criminal process intended to address individual accountability for
serious international offences might be further queried considering the clearly
undemocratic nature of the Security Council, which is composed of an elite
group of five permanent and 10 non-permanent members. Though hardly representative of the main regions of the modern post-Cold War world, each of the five
permanent members wield tremendous power including the ability to veto decisions supported by all of the other 14 members.
7.1.2. ICCJurisdictionover a Sitting Head ofState
A second and related set of legal controversies is about the Court's competence to
issue an arrest warrant for a sitting president of a non-party like the Sudan. It is
139) In fact, Sudan, like many other African countries, was a British colony until 1 January 1956.

It therefore only became a UN member on 12 November 1956.
4) W Ali, 'ICC counsel criticizes Sudan handling of Bashir indictment', Sudan Tribune, 3 August

2008.
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also uncertain what the legal obligations are for States Parties in respect of enforcement of such a warrant, the provisions mandating cooperation under the Rome
Statute such as Articles 86 and 98(1) and general customary international law.
Furthermore, what, if any, are the consequences of a Security Council referral on
the immunities that accrue to President Bashir?
The ICJ, in the famous Arrest Warrant Case (2002), held that serving heads of
state enjoy absolute immunity from prosecution in foreign national courts.' 4'
However, it also found that they may be prosecuted by certain international tribunals, for instance the ICC, where they possess jurisdiction. 142 Nevertheless, as
Akande has suggested, this general position should be read in light of two further
conditions. 143 First, that the instrument (in this case the Rome Statute) abrogates
the immunity. Second, the concerned state is bound by that instrument. While
the first condition is easily met by Article 27(2) which denies immunity to serving
officials, the second might not because Sudan, to which the immunity attaches,
44
would likely continue to enjoy them under customary international law.'
As Sudan came under the jurisdiction of the Court because of the Security
Council referral, the crucial question is whether it in effect terminated Bashir's
immunity. Neither the Rome Statute, nor the referral resolution sheds any light
on the issue. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, which approved the arrest warrant in
March 2009, glossed over the matter in a terse two-page discussion in which it
found that his current position as Head of State had no effect on the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction over his case.' 4 Yet, it had already been suggested by commentators that by fiat of the Chapter VII resolution, the immunity may have
been lifted either through the referral resolution's specific decision in operative
paragraph 2 that the Government of Sudan shall 'cooperate fully with" the ICC,
or alternately, on the basis that the mere referral of the situation automatically
bound Sudan as if it were a party to the Rome Statute, including the provision
abrogating immunities. 46 Without saying so, the latter approach appears to have
14 7
been implicitly endorsed by the pre-trial judges.

141)

Case Concerning the Arrest Warrantof 1I April 2000 (DemocraticRepublic of Congo v. Belgium),

Judgment, 14 February 2002, para. 58.
1421)Arrest Warrant (2002) Judgment, para. 61.
14') D. Akande, 'The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Immune from ICC Prosecution',
Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series, 30 July 2008 at 2.
144) Akande, ibid., at 2.
145) Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Bashir Arrest Warrant, supra note 79, at paras.
41-45.
146) Akande, supra note 143, at 2.
147) Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Bashir Arrest Warrant, supra note 79, at para.
45 (finding that the Security Council, by referring Sudan, 'accepted' that investigations and prosecutions arising therefrom will be conducted under the statutory framework provided for in the
Court's primary and secondary legal instruments).
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The first suggestion is relatively more persuasive. Among the difficulties of
the latter are these. First, a strong argument can be made that for the Security
Council to revoke as fundamental a right as that of the immunity of a serving
president, which immunity accrues to the benefit of the state (Sudan) as opposed
to the person occupying the office (Bashir), the referral resolution would have to
explicitly nullify that immunity. If this is so, it presumably would be easy to
resolve the problem as there is nothing to stop the adoption of a further resolution eliminating that immunity. Were this to happen, an interesting question
would be the legal effect of any objections that Sudan might make to such a resolution in relation to the immunity question and its intersection with the obligations of states not party to the Rome Statute.
A second objection could be that while the Security Council is competent to
adopt measures aimed at restoring international peace and security, it does not
possess the power to unilaterally impose treaty obligations upon a state. The UN
Charter does not expressly give it such powers. One might then argue that the
abrogation of Sudan's immunity is an implied power necessary for the performance of its peace maintenance functions. Without wading into controversies
about the extent and limits of implied powers doctrine as developed by the ICJ,
it is certain that the UN and its various organs are bound to act in accordance
with the principles and purposes of the organization outlined in their founding
charter and within the confines of international law. Regarding Sudan (which is
a signatory to the Rome Statute), if it is true that the effect of the resolution is to
import all the obligations therein, it can be cogently argued that the Security
Council would be effectively imposing or substituting the missing ratification.
That would undermine the consensual basis of international treaty law and is
likely to be untenable. Similarly, it is undisputed that Article 103 of the UN
Charter gives precedence to the treaty establishing the UN and would override
any obligations under another international agreement. Nevertheless, it is of little
assistance here because Sudan has obviously not yet assumed any such obligations. In the circumstances as well, it would be highly surprising if it did so in the
near future.'48
On the other hand, it has been argued that Security Council practice which
paved the way for the ICTY to try President Slobodan Milosevic and the ICTR
to convict Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, because of the Chapter VII resolutions creating those tribunals, abrogated immunities.'49 However, those situations appear to be distinguishable from the Sudan scenario. The relevant countries

14m This argument was inspired by a similar one made in relation to a Chapter VII resolution
adopted by the Security Council, which purported to bring into force the Statute of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon. See B. Fassbender,'Reflections on the International Legality of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon', 5 JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice(2007) 1090-1105, at 1098.
) Akande, supra note 143, at 3.
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did not seem to object to the nullification of the immunity. This should not be
surprising. Milosevic, who was discredited domestically, lost power to the opposition. In fact, this enabled his surrender for trial. In the case of Rwanda's Kambanda,
he was no longer in office at the time of his indictment and conviction. With the
Hutu genocidal regime that he presided over having lost the war and on the run,
the new mostly Tutsi-led government composed largely of former enemies had no
other interest but in Kambanda's arrest and prosecution on pain of the death
penalty. It was therefore the most unlikely to argue for immunity in his favor.
The fact is that we are here dealing with a head of state still holding office.
It should be expected that Sudan's general objection that its sovereignty is being
violated because it is not a party to the Rome Statute will be raised on the immunity question as well- as self-serving as it may be for Bashir to make it. Nevertheless,
even if we take it for granted, as the Pre-Trial Chamber appears to suggest - albeit
"without prejudice to a further determination on the matter"' 0 - that the Chapter
VII referral is sufficient legal basis for the Court to order Bashir's arrest for alleged
international crimes irrespective of any immunities that Sudan may enjoy under
international law, it is of concern but still perhaps too early to tell what the practical implications would be for international relations - as the AU has argued. In
the face of such uncertainty, one effect we will likely see is for pro-ICC states, for
example within the European Union, to refuse to receive the Sudanese President
on their territory as a matter of policy thereby limiting his freedom to travel.
Similarly, we may see other states, including those that are not necessarily as
enthusiastic about international criminal justice, also restrict or deny visits from
the indicted leader to avoid the embarrassment of non-compliance with their
international legal obligations under the Rome Statute and the customary international law of immunities. Whatever the case, the jury is still out on the fundamental question whether the Security Council is any better positioned than States
to do more than trigger the jurisdiction of the Court through referral of a situation to the Prosecutor.

7.1.3. The ICC, "Self-referrals"and their Implications
A third legal challenge for the ICC arose from its first referral from Uganda.
Scholars questioned whether such "self-referrals" were contemplated and permissible under the Rome Statute.' 5' The Prosecutor stated a preference for them as
they underscored the existence of the requisite political will to cooperate by the
See Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Bashir Arrest Warrant, supra note 79, at
para. 41.
151
WA. Schabas, 'First Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court', 25 Human Rights Law
I50)

Journal(2006) 25-40, at 8 and 18-19 (arguing that the drafting history of Art. 14 demonstrates that
self-referrals were not contemplated; that historical and logical reasons militate against permitting
self-referrals; and that the ICC Prosecutor effectively allowed Uganda to 'jump the queue' vis-a-vis
the 100 or so other States Parties to the Rome Statute).
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referring state. Schabas, a leading commentator, subsequently observed that ratification may well be the ultimate indication of political will.' 52 On the other
hand, Gaeta suggests that self-referrals, while not without some pitfalls, appear to
be a better option in comparison to referrals activated by third states or even cases
developed using the proprio motu prosecutorial power.'53 Kress went even further
to argue that self-referrals may be reconcilable with State Party obligations if they
are understood as broadly requiring that a state take genuine steps to investigate
and prosecute crimes, irrespective of whether it chooses to do so itself or through
extradition to another state or even by way of surrender of its jurisdiction to an
54
international criminal tribunal.'
Taking a long-term perspective, it appears that there has not yet been sufficient
practice to reach firm conclusions on the propriety, or lack thereof, of self-referrals. Nonetheless, some of the States Parties to the treaty, as well as the Prosecutor,
have all interpreted the provisions of the Rome Statute as permitting such referrals and the judges have, by admitting those cases, endorsed this interpretation.
This may be an important step forward given how reluctant states generally are to
bring human rights complaints against other states before international adjudication mechanisms. Of course, here the nuance is that they are not referring others,
only themselves. Nevertheless, the habit of making self-referrals may well start to
spill over into referrals of other states - presumably in situations where the complainant state stands to benefit in the outcome.
At the same time, once a referral has been made by a party, the Prosecutor was
correct to treat it as applicable in respect of the whole situation instead of, as
referring states like Uganda would have it, the crimes only allegedly committed
by its adversary - the LRA. But for the so-called policy of "symmetric interpretation" of referrals, the ICC objective of ending impunity would be seriously undermined because it would have allowed states to essentially "hijack" the Court to go
after their enemies while their armed forces escape any form of international
accountability.55
An additional concern meriting consideration is the question whether the
referring state can claw-back on a referral and reassume primary jurisdiction. This
is what Uganda has since tried to do in an attempt to reach a compromise with
the LRA. The answer will likely have to turn on the facts of each situation. Even
so, at a general level, it is clear both from the letter and spirit of the preamble and
substantive provisions of the Rome Statute, and indeed the purpose of the ICC
as a whole, that states have a primary obligation to prosecute serious international
crimes. The regime of complementarity is the centre-piece of this logic. In this

112)

Ibid., at 18-19.

M)" Gaeta, supra note 15, at 950-951.
Is4) Kress, supra note 15, at 946.
's"
Gaeta, supra note 15, at 950-951.
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light, it does not appear to be a stretch to argue that a claw-back should be possible, ideally in consultation with the Prosecutor, and consistent with Articles 17,
18 and 19 of the Rome Statute. This assumes, of course, that the State Party
would be acting in good faith, perhaps in response to a significant change of
circumstances or for other legitimate reasons, and that it is willing and able to
prosecute under Article 17. Preferably, disagreements over such issues would be
presented to, and ultimately resolved by, the judges of the Court.
7.1.4. Selection of Indictees andthe Hiccups of the First (Lubanga) Trial
Another legal challenge for the ICC is the criticism regarding the Prosecutor's
selection of indictees. It was rightly argued that states are the jurisdictions of first
resort. So, in the case of Lubanga who was apparently in jail in DRC for alleged
crimes there, the country seemed to have taken at least some steps to fulfill its
obligation to prosecute him through its national courts. 5 6 It was consequently
incorrect for him to be incarcerated for a long period and then transferred from
jail into ICC custody, ostensibly because he had allegedly committed the more
heinous crime of child recruitment to justify international takeover of the case.
This led one commentator to conclude that the Court may have unwisely thrown
15 7
caution to the wind in its eagerness to secure a first case.
To be fair, the DRC situation came to the Court by way of a self-referral.
However, this concern about its exercise of jurisdiction over Lubanga remains
valid because there is no obligation on the Prosecutor under the Rome Statute to
accept a referral following the conduct of his own independent investigations.
Even where he accepts a self-referral, he is also equally free to determine, based on
the evidence he has gathered, those persons he deems "most responsible" for a
possible prosecution for genocide, crimes against humanity and or war crimes.
This would surely include the power not to indict those already under genuine
prosecution under national processes.
Furthermore, the Prosecutor's handling of the Lubanga case did not help the
ICC's reputation. The trial finally started in The Hague in early 2009. While the
kinks usually associated with first cases in international criminal proceedings will
hopefully be worked out, the Trial Chamber felt compelled in 2008 to stay the
proceedings and to order the Accused's release.' 58 The judges found that a fair trial

Schabas, 'First Prosecutions', supra note 151 at 28, 30, 31.
Ibid. at 38.
15) Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber 1, 'Decision on the
156)
157

4
Consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 5 (3)(e) agreements
and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with others issues raised at the
Status Conference on 10 June 2008', 13 June 2008; 'Decision on the release of Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo', Trial Chamber I, 2 July 2008 and 'Decision on the request of the Prosecutor for suspensive
effect of his appeal against the "Decision on the release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo"', Appeals

Chamber, 7 July 2008.
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would be impossible because the Prosecutor had entered into confidentiality
arrangements with third parties and consequently failed to disclose significant
potentially exculpatory material to the defence. They reasoned that this had "ruptured" the trial process to such a degree that it was "impossible to piece together
the constituent elements of a fair trial."' 59 The Appeals Chamber agreed, but in
light of new developments enabling disclosure, remitted the case back to the trial
judges for reconsideration.160 The stay was subsequently lifted by the judges who
6
found a change of circumstances.' '
Lubanga has suffered significant delays between his arrest and start of trial,
partly because of prosecutorial decisions on the conduct of investigations and
evidence collection. Contrary to popular commentary at the time, however, the
ruling may be a positive sign given all that it suggests about the independence of
the judges in their work. From a long-term view, their abuse of process decision,
in which they demonstrated that they would even dismiss the symbolically important first case to ensure fair trial guarantees, may prove to be the saving grace for
the legitimacy of the Court in respect of the maiden case and indeed the larger
fledgling tribunal.
7.1.5. Justice. But for Whom?
A further issue that has been debated, animated by developments in the Taylor
case at the SCSL, is the question whether the ICC should be holding trials in
Europe for crimes alleged to have been committed by Africans against other
Africans within Africa. It should be obvious that such far away trials will cost
more money. However, a bigger problem has been whether the victim communities would not be deprived of an opportunity to see the trial process unfold first
hand. Is remote justice effective?
This is a question that will have to be addressed by the Court once it has more
than a single trial underway. In this regard, the idea of holding hearings of cases
in the Africa region, which is apparently supported by some of the ICC judges,
may be logistically difficult to execute keeping in mind security and cost considerations. Nevertheless, if done, it would likely go a long way to bridge the growing emotional distance between the Court and many of its supporters in Africa.
It will no doubt help boost the legitimacy of the ICC in the eyes of the people of
the continent.
M) Decision on the Consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials, ibid., at para. 93.
6) Prosecutorv. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Appeals Chamber, 'Judgment on the
appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the
application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the
Status Conference on 10 June 2008"', 21 October 2008.
161) Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, 'Reasons for Oral
Decision lifting the stay of proceedings', 23 January 2009.
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7.2. PoliticalChallenges
7.2.1. ICC-Style Justice Crowds out Possibilitiesfor Peace and Reconciliation
There are obviously many political challenges facing the ICC as it goes through
growing pains. Only three of the more significant ones are considered in this
article. In relation to Africa, a key controversy that the Court will have to confront, if governments on the continent are to continue backing it, is the perception that the legal tool is too blunt an instrument for use in all situations. In this
regard, the ICC has already been criticized for allegedly standing in the way of a
peace agreement between belligerents in places such as Uganda. The argument on
this matter tends to come in two shades.
First, it is said that the African attitude towards justice emphasizes reconciliation rather than the kind of retribution that the criminal law engenders. 62 In
this regard, it may in some situations be better for enemies to bury the hatchet
and allow the society to move on, especially where a military victory has proved
impossible - as is often the case in rebel insurgencies. This decision in turn
entails a give and take that normally includes some provision for a form of forgiveness, apology or amnesty - as bitter as that pill maybe to swallow. Such an
approach also permits for deployment of local or traditional forms of justice that
may be more aligned with African traditions.163 Liberia, Uganda, Rwanda and
even post-apartheid South Africa are usually invoked to illustrate the force of
this argument."
Second, a negotiated end to hostilities is not only a desirable option in some
instances, it is the pragmatic, if not the only, option to avert further catastrophe
and international humanitarian law violations. This argument becomes one about
both what has happened in the past as well as what might happen in the future.
To what extent is there responsibility to address crimes of the past while working
to prevent other imminent ones in the future? It also inevitably becomes a question about the ownership of the choice. Does the Court, or for that matter any
distant international institution, possess the legal and moral right to make such
far reaching decisions for war-battered African communities?
On this issue, the example usually offered is that of the northern region of
Uganda which has experienced a tragic low-intensity conflict for decades thereby
constituting one of Africa's major human rights tragedies. Can those communities where the direct victims of war reside in displaced or refugee camps choose
to prioritize peace instead of justice? Or to prioritize peace now and aim to do

M. Palayiwa, 'What's the ICC up to?', 43 NewAfrican (May 2009) 16-20, 20.
Buteera, supra note 108, at 63-64.
64) In relation to Rwanda, reconciliation is encouraged through the traditional gacaca process
though only in respect of lower to middle ranking perpetrators. The highest ranking genocidaires,
i.e. those at the level that would attract ICC interest, are tried in regular criminal trials.
62)

63)
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justice later? Does it matter that the crimes in issue are not local crimes, that they
are crimes against all of humanity? In other words, does the mere qualification of
the crimes under discussion as international offences raise them to a threshold
beyond the purview of the local community because of the more pressing inter65
national community interest?1
There are obviously no easy answers to such fundamental questions. None are
hazarded here. At the same time, one may observe that part of the difficulty is the
irony that those in the ICC and international institutions laying claim to the
right to make such decisions, ostensibly on behalf of the victims, would often
have never experienced any war and its psychological and other impact on a
population. We therefore end up in a paradox where, supported by the armchair
activism of some cheerleader Western human rights NGOs, officials such as the
Court's Prosecutor take entrenched positions - apparently in the name of the
victims. Sometimes, those positions are seen as not necessarily consistent with the
immediate needs and realities of those particular communities in Africa. This
argument is currently being used in discussions about the humanitarian situation
in the Sudan, especially in respect of the victims of the hostilities in Darfur.
This sort of debate has led to concerns about the kinds of decisions being taken
by the Prosecutor and raised uncertainty regarding whether or not he is properly
exercising his discretion. 66 One response could be that he is "independent".
Thus, he should have unfettered ability to decide what to do in a situation once
he has been invited to investigate heinous crimes. But that response goes only so
far to resolve the issue and leaves unsettled issues of perception and legitimacy,
both of which are important for a new international court of law mandated to
deliver deliberate, instead of "cow-boy", justice.
In addition, while the independence of the prosecutorial power is important
and should be closely safeguarded, thebasis for it is the rejection of any improper
interference in its exercise. However, the scope for exercise of such discretion at
the level of the Court is much narrower than might first appear. This is so considering the extensive limitations on the prosecutorial power carefully negotiated by
states and incorporated into the Rome Statute. These include use of provisions to
enable challenges to admissibility, preliminary judicial rulings on admissibility of
cases brought before the Court and even contestations about his assertions of
jurisdiction under Articles 17 to 19 of the Rome Statute. Those provisions generally affirm that the ICC, of which the Office of the Prosecutor is but one organ,
is and was intended to defer to genuine efforts to prosecute international crimes
at the national level.
15)

Palayiwa, supra note 162, at 20.

1(0 For a fine treatment of the notion of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC, see A.M. Danner,
'Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International
Criminal Court', 97 American JournalofInternationalLaw (2003) 510-552.
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On the flip side, the Rome Statute provides scope for review of prosecutorial
decisions not to initiate an investigation, or once initiated, a decision not to
prosecute under Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c). Indeed, Article 53(3)(a) and (b)
permits a referring state and even the Security Council to initiate review of a
decision not to pursue a matter. In addition, a pre-trial chamber may, on its own
initiative, conduct such a review. Of particular significance here is Article 53(4)
which gives the Prosecutor the opportunity to reconsider, at any time, a decision
whether or not to initiate an investigation or to prosecute based on new facts or
information.
Even beyond this provision, however, it is arguable that the exercise of discretion in law must be subject, or at least amenable, to some form of judicial review
where the decision taken leads to patently unreasonable results. In this context, it
may be that at later stages, the pre-trial and trial chambers of the ICC may be
seized of review challenges to the use of the prosecutorial power by states, accused
persons or even victims, for example, under Article 53 of the Rome Statute.

7.2.2. The "DoubleStandard"andU.S. "Exceptionalism"
But perhaps the biggest political challenge for the Court at this juncture, especially in relation to its legitimacy in Africa, is the "double standard" problem. T-he
idea that everyone is equal before and under the law underpins domestic legal
systems, especially in the area of criminal law. The position under international
law in relations between states is no different, at least in theory. This is enshrined
in the preamble and Article 2(1) of the foundational UN Charter which affirm
the "equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" and the
"principle of sovereign equality of all" states.
Essentially, as all human rights lawyers know, the principle of equality, whether
of individuals or of states, does not admit of arbitrary distinctions in respect of its
application based on states' or individuals' social, wealth, moral or other status.
The ideals of that principle seem to have clashed with Africa's sense of justice in
the face of current U.S. exceptionalism towards the Court. 67 In fact, the irony is
not lost on African countries that as a major power, the U.S. and two other states
(China and Russia), all of which are not parties to the Rome Statute, sit comfortably at the centre of a Security Council process that referred Sudan to the ICC for
investigations and possible prosecutions in March 2005. This in itself would ordinarily be perceived as problematic even without any allegations that the Bush
Administration oversaw, or was at least permissive towards, war crimes in the
context of hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003.

167) For an overview of the core issues, see WA. Schabas, 'United States Hostility to the International

Criminal Court: It's All About the Security Council', 15 European Journal of InternationalLaw

(2004) 701-720.
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As David Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes, and
others have argued:
US exceptionalism may have a place in international politics, but this concept has run its
course in the sphere of international criminal justice. No nation should ignore its duty to
bring war criminals to justice or otherwise shield its own leaders or soldiers from charges of
"
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.' '

Though not of the Court's making, key features of U.S. exceptionalism that are
creating, or reinforcing, negative perceptions of international criminal justice in
Africa and in the Third World are the following aspects of superpower policy.
First, the U.S. supports ad hoc international tribunals by funding them - a
policy adopted under the Clinton Administration and that arguably goes as far
back as Nuremberg and Tokyo. But the recent crop of the country's leaders have
allegedly overseen the commission of human rights violations, including crimes
as heinous as torture and disappearances, in Iraq (Abu Ghraib) and Cuba (Guantanamo Bay). This has occurred under cover of the "War on Terror". Guantanamo,
as numerous independent human rights bodies have claimed, became a "rightsfree" zone. 69 Yet, no one, not even the ICC, threatens to prosecute the American
military or political leaders involved.
Those who advocate such prosecutions often fail to take into account that the
U.S. is not a party to the Rome Statute. Nonetheless, as we saw earlier, it is possible for the ICC to assert jurisdiction in respect of non-parties and their nationals in limited instances, especially through a Security Council referral. However,
this is highly unlikely to lead to prosecution of American leaders because of the
veto power conferred on the permanent members, including the U.S., as well
as her allies Britain and France. The current political reality makes it impossible for African countries to imagine a scenario where the U.S. would be referred
to the Court by the Security Council. To already skeptical critics, this becomes
a form of reaffirmation of the skewed nature of global politics and the selectivity
of international criminal law. Issues of justice have thus become mired in, and
some might even say held hostage by, big power politics. The knock on effect has
been a blurring of the crucial distinction between international law and international politics if the project of global justice is to flourish and gain global
legitimacy.
In any case, matters were exacerbated by Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo' decision
not to apply for authorization to investigate possible international crimes in Iraq
even though some of the belligerents there, such as the United Kingdom, are

168)

Schefer et aL, supra note 96.

I,9) See, e.g., Center for Constitutional Rights, Report on Torture and Cruel Inhuman, and Degrading

Treatment of Prisonersat GuantanamoBay Cuba (New York: CCR, 2006) (quoting a U.S. military
intelligence officer telling prisoners 'You are in a place where there is no law - we are the law.').
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parties to the Rome Statute. Indeed, in February 2006, he publicly notified that
he had received many complaints regarding the Iraq situation but that he had 1no70
competence to prosecute the crime of aggression (which is yet to be defined).
Moreover, curiously relying on information partly furnished by British authorities, he also concluded that there were no reasonable indicia of elements of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and, importantly, that the requisite
gravity threshold had not been achieved. By comparison, one might query how
this threshold was achieved in the CAR situation despite the low number of
reported victims there over a two-year period. In any event, the belligerents in
Iraq were not parties to the Rome Statute. In Africa and indeed other parts of the
developing world, as various commentators have observed, "few have been con171
vinced by this official explanation".
Second, the U.S. adopted domestic legislation precluding cooperation with
the Court. The American Service Members Protection Act (2002) - the so-called
"Hague Invasion Act" - provided a mechanism to penalize any country, includ72
ing through military force, that dared to hand over a U.S. national to the ICC.,
This position was seen as outright bullying and as an attempt to undermine the
universality of international criminal law. Nevertheless, the Court has not publicly expressed a position condemning it. While this is not to suggest that the
ICC may not have its own private misgivings about the U.S. position, its silence,
which is interpreted as acquiescence, is deafening to many people in Africa. This
state of affairs bolsters, rightly or wrongly, those who argue that international
criminal law is being used as a whip to discipline only weaker and poorer Third
World states in impoverished continents like Africa, but not powerful states in
the developed world - as President Kagame of Rwanda has suggested.
Third, during the Bush Administration, the U.S. forced many developing
countries to sign Article 98 agreements wherein promises are made not to handover American nationals to the ICC without first securing its consent; the
countries faced the prospect of losing all financial, military and humanitarian
aid if they failed to sign what was dubbed by human rights activists as "Bilateral
Impunity Agreements". 171 While over 36 countries in Africa signed those agreements, a good number of mostly larger states on the continent, such as South
Africa, refused to balk under the pressure. They lost much needed American
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Statement on communication concerning the situation in Iraq',
9 February 2006.
170 Chitiyo and Devlin, supra note 106, at 69.
172) Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Press Release, 'US Congress Passes Anti-ICC
"Hague Invasion Act"', 26 July 2002, online at: <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/07.26.02ASP
AthruCongress.pdf> (visited 15 May 2009).
1711Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 'USA and the ICC: Bilateral Immunity
Agreements', online at: <http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=bia> (visited 15 May 2009) and Human
Rights Watch, 'Briefing Paper on Bilateral Immunity Agreements', New York, 20 June 2003.
170)
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assistance.' 74 It is so far unclear whether that aid has been reinstated under the
new Obama Administration.
Lastly, the U.S. has moved to block even initial suggestions at legal action
implicating the conduct of its own leaders or allies in the courts of certain national
jurisdictions. For example, the U.S. threatened Belgium after that country's
national courts invoked universal jurisdiction to indict Defence Secretary Donald
H. Rumsfeld and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The indictments were
dropped and Belgian law changed after the U.S. apparently signaled it would
advocate for the relocation of the NATO headquarters from Brussels to another
state. 175 Ironically, all this took place even as European courts, especially in France,
Belgium and Spain, were flexing legally questionable muscle over high ranking
officials in Rwanda and elsewhere based on expansive theories of universal
1
jurisdiction. 76
Again, while these are unilateral actions of a particular state instead of ICC
decisions, they help to feed African allegations about bias and the selective nature
of international criminal law. It also suggests the regime's amenability to political
manipulation by big powers - whether before international or national criminal
courts. In this vein, President Kagame has suggested that the people of the continent must ask the question: "Is it only the African involved in criminal activity?"
To him, this issue is also about historical hegemonies. Taken to its logical conclusion, he urges all Africans to "fight this tendency for Europeans to always cast
themselves in the role of judge and the African always as the guilty party."'177
The U.S. has insisted that it was merely looking out for its own national interests. Of course, its stance is expected to soften with the advent of the Obama
Administration. There are already early signs of this as it now takes public positions defending the Court's decision to issue an arrest warrant for Bashir. It also
condemned his expulsion of humanitarian aid groups from Sudan. 178 Though it
is unlikely that it will be acceding to the Rome Statute anytime soon, many
174)0.Bekou

andS. Shah, 'Realising the Potential of the International Criminal Court: The African
Experience', 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006) 499-544, at 537.
175)
R. Brody, 'Belgium Curtails Anti-Atrocity Law Under U.S. Pressure', ACLU InternationalCivil
Liberties Report 2003, online at: <http://www.sdshh.com/ICLR/ICLR_2003/12-Brody.pdf> (visited 15 May 2009).
171) Thalmann, 'French Justice Endeavours to Substitute for the ICTR', 6Journaloflnternational
CriminalJustice (2008) 995-1002.
177)
S. Kanuma, 'I refuse to be a servant of the West', The East African, 22-28 December 2008
at p. 8.
178)
See, e.g., 'Statement by Ambassador Susan E.Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, on the ICC's Arrest Warrant for Sudanese President Bashir', 4 March 2009, online
at: <http:/Iwww.iccnow.org/documents/Statement-byAmbassadorRice.pdf> and 'Statement by
Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations on the Expulsion
of Humanitarian Groups from Sudan', 6 March 2009, online at: <http://www.usunnewyork
.usmission.gov/press.releases120090306_O43.htm> (visited 15 May 2009). The U.S. Congress
even recently passed a resolution commending the ICC for its issuance of the Bashir warrant.
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household name Western NGOs are so giddy that the superpower seems to be
changing its stance on the ICC that they have ignored the harm being done to the
Court by its increasingly damaged image in Africa.
Ultimately, the fact is that the ICC - as an institution - may not have much it
can do about the U.S. policy towards it. But the foregoing undoubtedly reinforce
the historic divisions between the North and South whereby powerful states are
perceived as being let off the hook of prosecution while the weakest links are
targeted in Africa. Indeed, in the wake of the Bashir arrest warrant, the Court has
been accused of being fervently pro-Western in furthering the interests of
American exceptionalism. Its apparent inability or unwillingness to confront the
U.S. is seen as a hypocritical compromise coming at the expense of the universalist values of international law which it claims to espouse. 79
African scholars like Mamdani have even suggested that after its initial opposition, the U.S. realized that it could turn the ICC into a "useful tool" to advance
its interests. This is what it apparently proceeded to do. The Bush Administration
moved, as part of this shift, from outright opposition to the world criminal court
to a policy of "mutual accommodation" with it. In return, the Court has obliged
by making policy decisions that either keeps it out of Washington's way or panders to it.'8 ° To Mamdani, even in Africa, it is no accident that the ICC is only
conducting investigations in four countries in which the U.S. has no particular
interests or objections to the course charted by the Court.
Even more striking, in his view, is that there is a new "humanitarian order", of
which the ICC is a part, whereby sovereignty is wrested away from poor nations
by big powers. On this view, the responsibility to protect takes on imperialistic
undertones as the Court is co-opted by the world's only superpower to target its
adversaries, specifically the Sudan, while turning a blind eye to equally questionable actions by U.S. allies. Countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, which were
both linked to the crisis in the eastern Congo, have benefited from the ICC's
"pragmatic" policy of appeasement of the big powers.' 8 '
In assessing the validity of Mamdani's critique, a couple of points are immediately apparent. First, his is a political science analysis of the current ICC-Africa
relationship. Second, such an analysis challenges us, as lawyers, to unpack controversial issues and therefore adds to our understanding of the complex and nonlegal factors that may be at work. However, from the perspective of international

Chitiyo and Devlin, supra note 106, at 69.
180) While Mamdani does not cite this in his article, influential American commentators have
argued that even if the U.S. does not wish to become a party to the ICC for now, it 'needs the ICC
to help it climb back into a position of global leadership.' Remaking its image as a credible 'friend
of the ICC' was suggested as a way for it to influence the work of the permanent court to its advantage. See Scheffer et aL, supra note 96.
"') Mamdani, 'Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order', supra note 70.
'79)
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law, his claims are open to serious criticism that they are exaggerated. In addition,
his analysis was unfair for failing to show sensitivity to the history of how the four
African situations came into the Court's purview, especially in respect of the
Sudan hot potato which was essentially handed to it by the Security Council. Nor
does it account, for that matter, for the apparent African participation in its creation or within the current decision making of its various organs.'82 While it is
anecdotally reported that the Prosecutor "encouraged" the Ugandan, DRC and
CAR self-referrals, it remains true that the investigations into those situations
were possible only because the relevant African states signed on to and ratified the
Rome Statute. Those countries have also permitted and supported the ICC investigations that led to the various warrants of arrest. His claims would therefore
have been significantly bolstered were they grounded in application of the relevant legal texts.
7.2.3. The Depredationsand Scars of Colonialism
An additional challenge for the Court's achievements of its mandate in Africa has
to do with the burden of history. As already alluded to, African countries are very
conscious of and, some might say even scarred by, the depredations of colonialism. In the violent colonial encounter between Africans and Europeans that lasted
for hundreds of years, international law did not only allow its language to be
subverted by the cause of the big powers, it assisted by offering intellectual justifications for the mission civilatrice. Certainly, as Anghie and Chimni, two respected
scholars in the so-called Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
have argued, it was "principally through colonial expansion that international law
achieved one of its defining characteristics: universality."' 83 Indeed, TWAIL scholars show that international law was used to justify and legitimate the suppression
of Third World peoples and therefore shaped the relationships of power and subordination inherent in the colonial order. To many of these scholars, colonialism
was a key to the development of international law.
It follows that Africa and other formerly colonized societies must always be
vigilant of the use to which international law, including international criminal
182) Concerns have been expressed by some African countries that the majority of ICC staff hail
from other regions of the world. Nonetheless, there appears to be a sizable African contingent in the
Court - at least at the senior levels. These include four judges (one of whom is the Vice-President),
the Deputy Prosecutor, the Deputy Registrar, the Head of the Complementarity Division in the
Office of the Prosecutor, the Senior Trial Attorney handling the Sudan file, the head of the Office
of the Public Counsel for the Defence, a senior legal adviser in the Registry and various other lawyers in these and other units. In relation to the controversial Bashir warrant, it is noteworthy that a
Ghanaian judge was strategically appointed to preside over the Pre-Trial Chamber that assessed the
Prosecutor's application. In view of their roles, it is hard to argue that these officials are not partaking of the decisions taken by the Court. Even so, Africa is not as well represented in the offices of
the ICC as much as it is in the dock.
W3)Anghie and Chimni, supra note 118, at 84.
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law, can be put by powerful states. Mamdani's views would find more support
here. Indeed, he has in fact suggested that the language of law has simply been
subverted by the big powers to establish a "new humanitarian order". On this
view, the global transition from the old system of sovereignty to a new humanitarianism confined to "failed" or "rogue states" has created a bifurcated international system whereby state sovereignty obtains in large parts of the world but is
"suspended in more and more countries of Africa and the Middle East." He further decries the "emphasis on big powers as the protectors of rights internationally." This, he warns, is increasingly being twinned with the corollary belief that
big powers should be "enforcers of justice internationally" - to the detriment of
the weaker nations and their peoples.' 84 One need not subscribe to all these views
to appreciate that, going forward, the challenges for the legitimacy of international criminal law will be many considering that the growth of the system will
likely be shaped, or at least impacted by, the myriad interactions and inevitable
collision of legal rules and external political imperatives and the governmental
responses to them.

8. Condusion
The Africa-ICC relationship currently appears to be confronted with some major
challenges. However, because of the dynamism of international relations, that
relationship will continue to evolve. In this regard, a number of tentative observations may be offered keeping in mind that it is still in its infancy.
To start with, African countries are showing an increasing commitment to
addressing serious human rights abuses perpetrated by non-state actors within
their territories. As part of this trend to fashion "African solutions to African
problems", they have undertaken to make human security a priority for their
people, including through conceptualization of an ambitious and unprecedented
regional peace and security architecture with a legal mandate to take concrete
steps, including military action, to anticipate and avert serious international
crimes. This is significant given the reality that the doctrine of responsibility to
protect has remained nothing more than a theoretical discussion in other parts of
the world. In addition, it is because of reasons of self-interest and historical experience with untold atrocities that Africa early on supported the idea of the ICC;
long before its birth - in fact, while in gestation in the belly of the international
community. 'hat support, as we saw, was displayed in the way the continent
played an important role in the establishment of the Court. Since then, African
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countries took the first crucial steps to refer situations to the permanent penal
court for investigations.
Considering the current impasse between the AU and the ICC, it seems clear
that the embattled continent has some strong and legitimate concerns about how
international prosecutions may fit into its broader peacemaking and peace building objectives. In relation to the Sudan situation which has ignited substantial
controversy that will likely continue, for example, the AU has reiterated that it is
not opposed to prosecutions but that it is concerned about the timing of prosecutions. In this unprecedented area, some measure of controversy is perhaps inevitable. Still, concerns about the timing of prosecutions should not be discarded
lightly by the ICC Prosecutor, as their effect on further loss of life and human
rights violations may extend well beyond the realm of the legal to the humanitarian, political and economic.
In the long term, it should be recalled that African governments have urged the
Sudanese authorities to take concrete steps to improve human rights conditions
on the ground, all the while pressing for a comprehensive peace agreement
between the warring sides. They have gone even further, in collaboration with the
UN, to deploy thousands of peacekeepers in the country thereby showing that
they are willing to put their money where their mouths are. T-hese are all important considerations that must be weighed by the ICC and the international community, though the full implications of the Bashir arrest warrant remain unclear
at this stage. A humanitarian catastrophe could result. It could also propel
Sudanese authorities to end their alleged support for militants committing crimes
and perhaps lead to a measure of peace, if not a final resolution, of the Darfur
conflict.
From the perspective of the Court, I have suggested in this article that there is
presently emerging a fledging international criminal justice system of which it is
the anchor. The ICC has a mandate to prosecute, as a tribunal of last resort, international crimes committed within national jurisdictions that are unwilling or
incapable to do so. To some extent understandably, its work has so far focused on
this aspect. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor must now start attending to the much
harder task of engaging the prevention of further commission of international
crimes, a core rationale of prosecutions - as reflected in the preamble of the Rome
Statute. The prevention mandate is particularly important for the future success
of the Court as an international institution since, as Moreno-Ocampo himself
acknowledged, the number of cases prosecuted should not ultimately be the
benchmark for gauging its success. In this regard, it is probably time for his office
to shore up its programs to build national capacity to confront impunity, in line
with-the complementarity principle. When added to a serious outreach program
in Africa, this will help to address the misinformation and distortions about the
work of the ICC in a continent with low levels of literacy. Engaging directly and
aggressively with African civil society will also help the Court to build bridges
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with the local populations and to make it more likely to achieve its justice goals
on the continent.
At a more basic level, since my argument is about mutual gain and mutual
vulnerability for both Africa and the ICC, the relationship between the Prosecutor
and his African partners in the fight against impunity should not be allowed to
stray, or worse, become antagonistic - as appears to be the case currently. The
danger is that there may have already been a chilling effect to the Bashir warrant
because the AU has requested that all 30 African States Parties to the Court convene at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The stated purpose of the meeting, apparently scheduled for early June 2009, was for those states to "exchange
views on the work of the ICC in relation to Africa, in particular in the light of the
process initiated against African personalities, and to submit recommendations
thereon taking into account all relevant elements".'8 5 There is a strong possibility
that those discussions could lead to further political action that could be detrimental to the long-term interests of the Court as a young judicial institution.
Even if extreme action, such as a withdrawal of ratifications or referrals of one
or more African States Parties is not taken, as anecdotal evidence suggests is likely,
it may prod other countries from the continent to drag their feet in domesticating
the Rome Statute. This is significant because out of 30 States Parties from the
continent, only Kenya, Senegal and South Africa, have so far passed implementing
legislation in Africa. Furthermore, other African States Parties may withhold their
planned referrals, and signatories, their planned ratifications. It also will embolden
countries, for instance Rwanda and Angola, which have vowed never to become
part of the ICC to lobby other countries on the continent to their cause.
It is to be hoped that African leaders will in the end choose to register their
disagreements about current prosecutorial practice within, instead of outside, the
fledgling international criminal justice system anchored by the Court - whether
through applications before the Chambers or through other policy action within
the Assembly of States Parties. They will hopefully also unpack the false equation
that the Prosecutor is equal to the ICC, and for that matter, the idea that absolute
universal jurisdiction is equal to ICC jurisdiction. At the same time, the Court as
a legal institution, whose very essence is to help build an international rule of law,
must jealously guard its mission to ensure that it is not subverted, or perceived to
have been subverted, as a pawn for Great Power use to merely target weak and or
defeated adversaries in less influential regions of the world.

185) AU Assembly, Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor for
the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan (Dec. 221 (XII)), 3 February 2009,
para. 5.

